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Abstract 
This paper examines the stylised facts concerning stock price dynamics around seasoned 
equity offerings, using a sample of 463 seasoned equity offerings made on the Oslo Stock 
Exchange between 2000 and 2018. We introduce the ex ante stated use of proceeds as a 
differentiating variable to test various branches of the capital structure theory. 
Our main findings emphasise the importance of asymmetric information and agency issues in 
equity offerings, contradicting the more rationale explanations of the well documented “new 
issues puzzle”. Stocks of SEO firms exhibit on average abnormal announcement returns of -
4%, with a subsequent abnormal performance of -10% per year over a three-year period. We 
conclude that investors systematically underestimate, but correctly show the direction of 
valuation effects upon the announcement of equity offerings. While we do not preclude that 
mispricing is a partial determining factor of the security choice, we suggest that firms choose 
the least costly way of financing by utilising periods where the accessibility to capital is better, 
which appear to be associated with overly optimistic market expectations. 
Furthermore, the ex ante stated use of proceeds helps to differentiate issuers with better post-
offering prospects. We show that the market correctly incorporates new information revealed 
upon the announcement when proceeds are raised to fund specific investments. Conversely, 
our results indicate that the apparent timing motive generally is restricted to issuers disclosing 
vague investment plans or those who leave the filings ambiguous. These issuers seem to take 
advantage of “windows” where the investor sentiment is especially strong, and subsequently 
suffer from too optimistic market expectations. However, the underperformance is 
documented to be most severe for issuers of distressed equity, which appear to raise funds 
during prolonged market downturns and consequently fail to satisfactorily turn around the 
performance of its existing assets in place. 
Our findings are economically important in the sense that the disclosed information on the 
intended use of proceeds is publicly available upon or prior to the offerings. This means that 
investors can use ex ante information to get valuable insights into the future stock performance 
of the issuing firms. 
 
 6
Preface 
With the completion of this thesis, we mark the end of our Master of Science in Financial 
Economics at the Norwegian School of Economics. We entered September 2019 with no topic 
at hand, only a number of ideas. Our interest for corporate finance finally led us towards the 
stylised facts about the capital structure decision. 
The process has been of many ups and downs, leaving us, at times, with the feeling of 
perplexity. However, as Bertrand Russell once said: “The time you enjoy wasting is not wasted 
time”. We only grow through diversity, so we welcome the bumps on the ride. 
We would finally like to show our appreciation to our supervisor, Thore Johnsen, providing 
us with generous support and guidance throughout the process. In addition, we would like to 
thank DNB Markets for providing us with access to Dealogic, making this thesis possible.  
 
 
 
 
Bergen 20th December 2019 
 
 
 
 
Carl Jørgen Sundet Flaen 
 
Otto Moltke-Hansen 
 7 
1. Introduction 
Seasoned equity offerings have for long been subject of considerable debate in the academia. 
A vast body of existing literature documents a negative market reaction to the announcement 
of such offerings, and subsequently poor long-run stock returns. The price dynamics around 
these offerings seem to indicate that managers are issuing equity in periods of temporary 
overvaluation, where the market underreacts to information revealed upon the announcements. 
These stylised facts have been among the greatest challenges to the conventional paradigm of 
market efficiency and, to some researchers, motivated to the development of behavioural asset 
pricing models. 
Stigler (1964) was the first researcher to document the surprisingly low stock returns following 
seasoned equity offerings. The findings have later been documented by Spiess and Affleck-
Graves (1995) and Loughran and Ritter (1997), showing that SEO firms in the US 
underperform non-issuing control firms by 20-30% over a three-to five-year period. 
Supportive evidence is provided by Eberhart and Siddique (2002) and Burch et al. (2004). 
Levis (1995) and Armitage (2002) also provide early evidence on negative abnormal post-
issue returns in the UK, which Ngatuni et al. (2007) corroborate. However, Barber and Lyon 
(1997) and Kothari and Warner (1997) have shown that time aggregation of abnormal returns 
have a substantial impact on the results. Later, it has also been shown that pricing model 
specifications and time variation in expected returns may resolve the puzzling price dynamics 
(see Mitchell and Stafford, 2000; Eckbo et al., 2000). 
The debate of what causes the apparent ability of firms to time their equity issues to periods 
followed by low market returns is still inconclusive. Common explanations for the 
documented value decline can be put into to three broad non-mutually exclusive categories. 
First, researchers suggest that the announcement of a seasoned equity offering indirectly 
conveys negative information about the existing firm value. Given that the market slowly 
incorporates such information, firms can take advantage of asymmetric information and issue 
equity in periods of temporary overvaluation to transfer wealth from new to existing 
shareholders. Second, in presence of agency problems, the capital inflow may not be utilised 
in a value-maximising manner. This explanation suggests that firms with less valuable growth 
prospects are more likely to raise proceeds to engage in agency spending due to misaligned 
incentives between managers and shareholders. Lastly, more rational explanations have been 
developed over the last two decades, whereof some researches attribute the value decline to a 
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form of pseudo market timing or a failure in properly controlling for fundamental shifts in the 
riskiness of the firms’ assets around the offerings. 
In our study, we intend to analyse both announcement returns and long-run stock and operating 
performance following seasoned equity offerings on the Norwegian market. We also intend to 
better understand the motives for firms to issue seasoned equity, and the information that is 
revealed to the market about the quality of the issuers’ subsequent uses of capital inflow. This 
again helps us to better understand the role of agency issues and asymmetry between managers 
and investors in equity offerings. We revisit and provide new evidence on whether equity is 
issued for a value-increasing manner by focusing on firms’ stated intention for the proceeds 
soon-to-be raised. Using issuers’ filings from Oslo Bors NewsWeb, we document whether the 
use of proceeds is primarily intended for specific investments (Investment), vague growth 
initiatives (Capex), refinancing reasons (Refinancing), or if the firms left the filings ambiguous 
by stating that the majority of the capital is raised for general corporate purposes (General). 
As these filings are the primary source of information upon the announcement of equity 
offerings, managers may influence market expectations by the information they reveal, hence 
it is fundamental to understand the usefulness of such disclosures. 
We divide the empirical analysis into three steps. First, we examine the market reaction to the 
announcement of seasoned equity offerings in relation to the disclosed information on the 
intended use of proceeds. We expect issuers revealing specific investment motives to exhibit 
superior announcement returns relative to that of more ambiguous issuers, hence they are 
expected to credibly signal that proceeds are to be raised for profitable investments. This 
prediction is consistent with the findings of Silva and Bilinski (2015) and Walker and Yost 
(2008), who document that investors react positively to the announcement of specific 
investment plans, whereas more ambiguous issuers exhibit negative abnormal returns around 
the announcement date. Both papers find support in the view that agency issues are important 
factors in equity offerings. Second, we examine prospectus disclosure and long-run post-issue 
stock performance, using both the matched-firm technique and beta pricing models. Consistent 
with the expectations on announcement effects, we expect issuers disclosing specific 
investment motives to exhibit no abnormal performance over a post-issue period of three 
years. We also suggest that ambiguous issuers may be more likely to have a timing motive or 
similar attempt to mask bad information about firm prospects. Our predictions are based on 
findings by Autore et al. (2009), who find little significant ex post underperformance for 
issuers citing specific investment motives in the US. They argue that these issuers are raising 
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equity in response of arising investment opportunities, regardless of under-or overvaluation of 
their stocks. They also find that issuers that are vague about their primary motivation behind 
the offering, or intend to repay debt, appear to exploit overly optimistic market expectations. 
Finally, we examine ex post firm characteristics to better understand the link between ex ante 
stated use of proceeds and post-issue operating performance. Consistent with their findings on 
long-run stock performance, Autore et al. (2009) find evidence that issuers stating general or 
pure capital structure motives exhibit greater declines in the operating performance relative to 
that of issuers revealing specific investment plans. The findings are in line with Hertzel and 
Li (2007), who document that issuers with higher growth options invest more after the equity 
offerings and do not suffer from poor post-issue performance. We thus expect the ex post 
operating performance to be generally consistent with the findings on long-run post-issue 
stock returns. 
Our main findings suggest that prospectus disclosure on the intended use of proceeds helps to 
differentiate issuers that may have a timing-motive to those that are in immediate need of 
liquidity or credibly intend to take on arising growth opportunities. Firms revealing specific 
investment motives on average exhibit positive abnormal returns upon the announcement of 
the offering, and with no subsequently abnormal stock performance in the long-run. This 
suggests that these issuers are credibly signalling that the proceeds are raised for a value-
increasing manner. Moreover, we find large offer price discounts and negative stock returns 
upon the announcement for issuers stating that proceeds are raised for vague investment or 
general purposes. These issuers also exhibit strong pre-issue stock returns and subsequently 
poor  stock and operating performance in the long-run. Our findings suggest that ambiguous 
issuers are more likely to engage in agency spending or take advantage of periods of temporary 
stock overvaluation. Finally, the empirical results indicate that issuers stating refinancing 
reasons usually are in financial distress and raise equity during prolonged market downturns. 
The offer price is often set well below the market price to ensure a successful completion of 
the offering, where the announcement returns suffer accordingly. These issuers also 
significantly underperform benchmark firms matched on size and book-to-market ratio over a 
three-year period. We suggest that investors are too confident about a turnaround in the 
operating performance of these firms' existing assets, and are consequently disappointed when 
the performance does not improve satisfactorily. Overall, we find evidence that investors 
systematically underestimate, but correctly show the direction of, valuation effects upon the 
announcement of equity offerings when proceeds are not intended for specific investment 
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reasons. Consistent with previous literature, this implies that investors are overly optimistic 
about these firms’ prospects at the time of the announcement.  
Our paper contributes to the literature in three ways. Firstly, to our knowledge, the paper is 
the first to investigate the relationship between the ex ante stated use of proceeds and long-run 
post-SEO performance in the Norwegian equity market. Secondly, we provide evidence on 
the predictive ability of publicly-available information for long-run post-issue stock returns. 
Specifically, we show that differentiating SEOs on the basis of intended use of proceeds 
provides an opportunity to identify firms with better post-offering prospects. Finally, we take 
a second look on disclosed information on the intended use of proceeds and the market reaction 
upon SEO announcements using a somewhat broader sample than Width and Årseth (2018). 
We have organised the remainder of this paper as following. In Section 2, we provide an 
introduction to seasoned equity offerings, followed by some fundamental theoretical concepts 
relevant for our paper in Section 3. In Section 4, we review existing literature and present our 
expectations and hypotheses for the empirical analysis. In Section 5, we present a detailed 
description of our data and sample selection criteria, while we in Section 6 describe the 
different methodologies that we apply. Eventually, in Section 7 and 8, we present and discuss 
the empirical results, before we provide our conclusion in Section 9. 
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2. Seasoned Equity Offerings 
In this section, we provide an introduction to seasoned equity offerings as well as explaining 
the main reasons for raising external capital through the equity capital market. Furthermore, 
we present the most common flotation methods and how these are structured. We also describe 
different types of costs related to equity offerings. Eventually, we provide a brief description 
of some unique characteristics for the Norwegian equity market. 
2.1 Introduction to seasoned equity offerings 
Throughout the lifespan of a company, capital is necessary to secure sufficient financial 
flexibility to survive economic downturns or take on arising growth opportunities. When a 
firm is in need of capital, firms will have the choice of raising external funds or use internal 
financing, if available, also referred to as retained earnings. Given the likelihood that internal 
funds may be insufficient, raising funds from external sources may be the only viable 
alternative, more often than not. External capital can be raised in various ways, both in the 
private and public market. One of the main advantages of being publicly listed on a stock 
exchange is the improved accessibility to external capital, both equity and debt. Raising equity 
capital in the public market can be done through a seasoned equity offering (SEO), also 
referred to as a follow-on offering. An SEO refers to an equity offering that follows from a 
firm’s initial public offering (IPO). This type of raising capital is much like an IPO but 
differentiates in the way that the company is already publicly traded ex ante to the offering, 
hence the price setting is generally much less complex. Furthermore, we can differentiate 
SEOs between primary and secondary offerings. While a primary offering refers to the 
issuance of additional shares, secondary offerings are already outstanding shares sold by 
existing shareholders. Thus, only primary offerings or a mix between primary and secondary 
offerings raise proceeds for the issuer. 
When firms contemplate or decide to do a seasoned equity offering, an announcement is 
disclosed through a market channel for the respective stock exchange. The issuer is typically 
required to publish detailed terms and rights combined with relevant information on the 
company itself. These are restricted to regulatory requirements and may vary significantly 
according to jurisdictions. In relation to this, SEO firms typically disclose information 
regarding the main reasons for the equity issue, referred to as the intended use of proceeds. 
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The most common disclosed motives for conducting SEOs are needs for increased liquidity, 
refinance or replace existing or maturing securities, capital expenditures or new investments. 
Firms also reveal more vague information, such that the proceeds will be used for general 
corporate purposes. These prospectus disclosures are important in the way that some issuing 
firms may, for various reasons, have incentives to be more ambiguous on the intended use of 
proceeds, whilst others are better off by revealing specific information regarding the capital 
raise. We will discuss this further in Section 3.3. 
In relation to a contemplated seasoned equity offering, firms usually employ one or several 
investment banks to underwrite the equity issue, referred to as the underwriters. The 
underwriters typically act as advisors during the process and; originate, structure, and execute 
the offering. In most cases, they also guarantee for the completion of the issue. Their specific 
role and how they are selected vary from deal to deal, dependent on the issuers’ choice of 
flotation method. We refer to the flotation method as the choice of deal type; in other words, 
how the offering process is structured. This is important in the way that it may have a 
substantial impact on the pricing of the offering, execution time, targeted investors, and costs 
related to the underwriting process. We describe this further in the subsequent section. 
2.2 Flotation methods 
Following Gao and Ritter (2010), we categorise primary offerings into three major types: fully 
marketed offers, accelerated offers, and rights offers. While rights offers are exclusively 
directed towards existing shareholders, accelerated and fully marketed offers may open up for 
new investors. There also exist several subgroups within the three main categories of flotation 
methods, which differ in the way they are structured. The importance of the various deal types 
differs across countries, with larger capital markets exhibiting diﬀerent preferences than those 
in smaller capital markets (Eckbo et al., 2007). This has also varied over time. For instance, 
before the late 1990s, fully marketed offers dominated in the US, while rights offers were the 
more common choice of flotation method in regions such as Asia and Europe. During the last 
decades, more and more companies worldwide have raised equity through accelerated offers. 
Bortolli et al. (2008) suggest that this trend represents a shift towards an auction model. They 
find that these transactions are associated with lower underwriting fees and suffer less from 
underpricing. 
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2.2.1 Fully marketed offers 
In a fully marketed offer, the issuer usually appoints one or more investment banks to act as 
the underwriters on the deal, with the responsibility to price and market the potential offering. 
The process, which typically takes up to two-three weeks, resembles much like an IPO where 
the underwriters conduct due diligence investigation, certify the quality of the company, print 
prospectus and arrange a road show1. At the same time, the bookrunner (lead underwriter) 
examines the investor demand and builds an orderbook used to determine the offer price (Gao 
and Ritter, 2010). Subsequently, the final offer price and prospectus are disclosed, and the 
underwriters distribute shares to the participating investors. 
The flotation method is considered to be the most time-consuming form of an SEO and is often 
used by less recognised firms with a high degree of asymmetric information between managers 
and the market. Fully marketed offers are also considered as the most expensive deal type in 
terms of direct costs due to high underwriting fees and substantial marketing effort. However, 
in contrast to Bortolli et al. (2008), Geo and Ritter (2010) find evidence that marketing flattens 
the demand curve of the issuers’ stock, resulting in higher offer price and post-issue share 
price. Consequently, they argue that the choice of flotation method is much about a trade-off 
between direct and indirect costs2. 
2.2.2 Accelerated offers 
The second category of flotation method is accelerated offers, which can further be divided 
into accelerated bookbuild offers and bought deals. These types of offerings abstain from the 
time-consuming marketing period applied in fully marketed offerings. For accelerated 
bookbuild offers, the investment banks submit proposals for the right to underwrite the sale, 
often specifying a gross spread (Gao and Ritter, 2010). Then the issuing firm typically selects 
a syndicate of underwriters, which begin the bookbuilding immediately after the 
announcement of the offering. Due to this “accelerated” underwriting process, the execution 
time is usually less than 48 hours. 
 
1 Management of the issuing firm meets selected institutional investors, analysts, brokers etc. 
2 We describe these types of offering costs in Section 2.3 
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Unlike accelerated bookbuild offers, the issuing firm will in a bought deal announce the 
number of shares it contemplates to sell, and underwriters participate in an auction to acquire 
the total amount of these shares. The highest bidder (or a syndicate of bidders) wins the deal 
and re-sells the shares to investors, typically within 24 hours. As a consequence, the risk of 
financing is to a greater extent transferred to the underwriters in bought deals. However, the 
participating banks often end up acquiring the new shares at a fair discount, hence they are 
compensated for the increased riskiness of the underwriting process. 
In many cases, the announcement and execution of accelerated offers take place after market 
closing to reduce disruptions in the pricing process, hence an overnight bookbuild is often 
preferred. To secure a rapid execution process, the underwriters typically turn towards certain 
large institutional and private investors (this may also include some of the existing 
shareholders). The main advantage of accelerated offers compared to fully marketed offers is 
therefore the substantial reduction in time and resources spent on the offering, which in turn 
lower the costs related to the underwriting process. Due to the structure of these transactions, 
accelerated offers are often used by well-known firms, in smaller equity transactions, in 
acquisition processes, or firms in severe need of swift liquidity.  
2.2.3 Rights offers 
In contrast to fully marketed and accelerated offers, rights offerings only target existing 
shareholders. In a rights offer, current shareholders receive rights (short-term warrants) to 
purchase additional stock shares. The shares are offered on a pro rata basis at a fixed offer 
price. The shareholders then need to decide whether they want to exercise their rights or not. 
Consequently, the flotation method gives existing shareholders the opportunity to not be 
diluted in the equity offering. Furthermore, the deal type protects existing shareholders from 
underpricing as a potential discount accrues to themselves. To incentivise existing 
shareholders to participate in the offering, the subscription price (at which each share may be 
purchased) is generally set to a discount relative to the current market price, which also allows 
for adverse share price movements prior to the issue. However, it is common that the rights 
are transferable, allowing the holders of the rights to sell them in the open market, hence they 
are compensated for being diluted if they decide to not exercise their rights.  
While rights offers generally are preferable due to; the underpricing protection for existing 
shareholders, low underwriting costs, and non-dilutive characteristics (for participating 
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shareholders), the long duration of the subscription period makes the offering process more 
time-consuming and provides less structural flexibility for the issuer. Also, a rights issue may 
not be appropriate when raising large amounts of capital as the funds available to individual 
shareholders are likely to be somewhat limited (Watson and Head, 2007). 
2.3 Flotation costs 
An important notion in the choice of flotation method is the expected cost of the offering. 
Although not as costly as IPOs, seasoned offerings are still expensive. Eckbo et al. (2007) 
differ between direct and indirect flotation costs, where the direct costs include components 
such as: (i) underwriter compensation, primarily made up by fees to underwriters (including 
warrants and over-allotment options3);  and (ii) out-of-pocket expenses, including fees to law 
firms and accountants, registration and listing fees, printing, and marketing expenses 
(including road shows). Indirect flotation costs include: (i) underpricing, commonly referred 
to as the offer price relative to the closing price on the offer date or the pre-issue closing price; 
(ii) stock price reaction to the initial offering announcement (including any follow-up 
announcements on offering-specific characteristics), as this is affecting the offer price; and 
(iii) potential costs of delays and cancellations, in which the issuer is bearing most of the out 
of pocket expenses without realising the benefits of raising capital. 
It is well known that underwriting compensation represents an economically important portion 
of flotation costs when firms conduct seasoned equity offerings, documented to be in the range 
between 3% and 8% of gross issue proceeds (Lee and Masulis, 2007). Additionally, existing 
literature finds evidence of SEO announcement returns in the range between -2% and -3%. 
This has an important implication, as a firm offering 10% of current shares outstanding, 
assuming an announcement return of -2%, only raises the equity capital by 80% of the gross 
issue proceeds. Consequently, the equity announcement effect may also represent a significant 
component of equity flotation costs. In that respect, with the less costly process of rights offers, 
it has for a long time been puzzling why rights offers have not been the preferred choice of 
flotation method in some countries, notably the US. One argument is that the underwriter can 
more credibly certify the firm quality if taking on a larger role. Hence, in presence of 
 
3Overall-allotment option, also known as greenshoe provision, is an option available to underwriters to sell additional shares 
in an equity offering than initially planned. 
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asymmetric information and low expected shareholder takeup, the benefits of certification 
might overcome the underwriting compensation (Eckbo and Masulis, 1992). Also, this 
flotation type is subject to certain procedural requirements making the offering process more 
time-consuming. It is therefore plausible to believe that the limited flexibility also makes the 
flotation method less attractive. 
2.4 Characteristics of seasoned equity offerings in Norway 
Issuing new shares in the Norwegian market is a fairly uncomplicated process. In contrast to 
the US, the offerings are often carried out through an accelerated process, or more commonly 
referred to as private placements, reflecting the fact that these offerings often are directed 
towards a limited group of investors. However, security offerings in Norway need to comply 
with the equal treatment principles under the Norwegian Securities Act, which states that: 
issuers of financial instruments admitted to trading on a Norwegian regulated market must 
treat the holders of their financial instruments on an equal basis. Differential treatment is 
permitted if the issuer has factual basis in the common interest of the issuer and the holders4. 
In connection with equity offerings, this means that all the current shareholders must be treated 
equally unless the issuing firm and its shareholders, for various reasons, have a common 
interest in deviating from this. 
The increase in use of private placements in Norway has been subject to debate, as the existing 
shareholders not invited to participate in the offerings often are substantially diluted, without 
or only a small subsequent repair offering. Subsequent repair offers are to some degree a 
Norwegian phenomenon, where rights are offered to existing shareholders not invited to 
participate in the private placement, with the purpose of reducing the dilutive effect of the 
placement. Due to the strong trend in the use of private placements, Oslo Stock Exchange now 
intends to place particular emphasis on the issuers’ compliance with the duty to treat investors 
equally (Oslo Børs, 2019). 
 
4 Oslo Børs (2019). Guidelines on the rule of equal treatment.  
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3. Theoretical concepts related to equity offerings 
This section describes basic corporate finance theory on market efficiency and capital 
structure. Additionally, we explain some theoretical concepts commonly referred to in 
empirical studies on seasoned equity offerings. Finally, we present a theoretical example of 
why some firms reveal more specific information when contemplating to raise equity capital. 
Together, this underpins the basis for our expectations of the empirical findings in Section 7 
and 8. 
3.1 Market efficiency and capital structure in perfect capital 
markets 
3.1.1 Efficient market hypothesis 
Persistent long-run underperformance following IPOs and SEOs has been extensively debated 
in the literature, and has for many years been among the greatest challenges to the traditional 
paradigm of market efficiency. The efficient market hypothesis (EMH) asserts that securities 
reflect all available information, in other words, its true fundamental value. Thus, given that 
the securities markets are efficient, there should not be possible to out- or underperform the 
market over time. However, since information is costly, Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) argue 
that if securities reflect all available information, market participants do not have incentives 
to gather, analyse and trade on available information, hence securities will no longer reflect 
its intrinsic value. This is referred to as the efficiency paradox. They further argue that a non-
deteriorated market equilibrium only will arise if there exists sufficient market inefficiency, 
compensating for the cost of collecting and trade on the information. The profits earned by 
diligent investors may thus be considered as economic rents accruing to those that are willing 
to engage in the costly collection of information (Lo and MacKinley, 1999). 
Assuming that the semi-strong form of market efficiency holds, in which all publicly available 
information is reflected in the security prices, new public information that occurs should be 
reflected immediately following the announcement. Therefore, a corporate event study where 
new information is revealed may indicate the degree of market efficiency. The literature is 
somewhat inconsistent in its findings when studying different corporate events. However, 
DeBondt and Thaler (1985) suggest that the stock market tends to overreact to various news 
but will with time stabilise around its new intrinsic value. Moreover, Bernard and Thomas 
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(1989) analyse stock price reactions to earnings-announcements. Their findings suggest the 
existence of a post-announcement drift, in which new information is not fully reflected in the 
stock prices immediately after the announcement. They argue that the market fails to interpret 
the implications regarding the companies’ future earnings in light of current earnings, hence 
the new information will only be gradually reflected in the stock prices. However, a more 
recent study by Jeffrey et al. (2008) indicates that transaction costs can provide an explanation 
for both the persistence and the existence of the post-earnings announcement drift. 
3.1.2 Capital structure irrelevancy 
In an important paper that surprised researchers and practitioners at the time, Modigliani and 
Miller (1958) proposed that the value of a firm is independent of its capital structure and rather 
solely depends on its future cash flows. Their reasoning is under the assumption of perfect 
capital markets, where all securities are fairly priced, no taxes and transaction costs, and that 
the cash flows are not affected by the financing decision (Berk and DeMarzo, 2017). They 
argue that the cost of capital remains constant despite a change in the capital structure. The 
rationale is that higher leverage increases the risk of the equity, hence equity holders require 
higher returns to be compensated for the additional risk of holding the equity. Consequently, 
the increase in cost of equity is offset by higher leverage, as the cost of debt is lower than cost 
of equity, hence the cost of capital remains unchanged. Although the underlying assumptions 
of perfect capital markets do not hold in practice, the setting provides an important benchmark. 
3.2 Capital structure in imperfect markets 
In reality, the capital structure has considerable implications for firms that intend to raise 
capital. Firm managers spend much time, effort and expenses determining the optimal capital 
structure. There are also large, systematic variations in capital structures across industries, 
reflecting that the leverage is of critical importance to a firm’s future value and success. The 
latest theories suggest a trade-off between several factors when determining the optimal capital 
structure to maximize firm value. As firms pay taxes on income earned, they benefit from 
leverage in the way that interest on debt financing is tax-deductible, referred to as interest tax 
shield. This suggests that the optimal capital structure is when the interest paid on the debt 
equals the firm’s earnings before interest and taxes. However, leverage also increases costs of 
financial distress as the likelihood that a firm will be unable to meet its debt obligations 
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increases. Consequently, differences in the magnitude of financial distress costs and the 
volatility of cash flows can explain some of the differences in leverage across industries (Berk 
and DeMarzo, 2017). That said, the literature has extended the model to include other effects 
of leverage, as this solely cannot explain all variations observed. With the presence of market 
imperfections, the choice of capital structure can affect firms’ costs of financial distress, alter 
managers’ incentives, and signal information to investors. Thus, the trade-off theory also 
includes costs and benefits of incentives that arise of leverage. In relation to this, we present 
some of the most important implications for issuances of seasoned equity below. 
3.2.1 Agency issues 
For a levered firm, a conflict of interest arises if an investment decision has different 
consequences for the value of equity and the value of the debt, often more severe when the 
risk of financial distress is high (Berk and DeMarzo, 2017). As the management is hired and 
retained by the board of directors (which are elected by the shareholders), the managers may 
often take actions that harm the creditors while shareholders are better off. For instance, if a 
company is in severe financial distress, the managers may be willing to take on very risky 
investments as the shareholders have little (or nothing) to lose if the investment fails, even if 
the NPV of the investment is negative. However, this excessive risk-taking may decrease the 
expected value for the debtholders significantly. On the contrary, assuming that the same 
company only can invest in a less risky project with positive NPV and that the current firm 
value is less than the outstanding debt, the firm may choose not to finance the project as the 
shareholders might be worse off. This is referred to as the debt overhang or under-investment 
problem, representing an agency cost to the firm.  
Furthermore, Jensen and Meckling (1976) brought the agent theory into light by describing 
how misaligned incentives between agents (managers) and principals (debt and equity holders) 
can result in decisions favouring the agents at the expense of the principals. Since managers 
often face little threat of being replaced, unless the firms’ performance is very poor5, they can 
run the business in their own best interests without being exposed to the same risk as the 
principals. Jensen (1986) suggests that managers in levered firms with high levels of excess 
cash flow are more likely to raise capital to invest in a value-decreasing manner, as they may 
 
5 See, for example, D. Jenter and K. Lewellen (2012) – Performance-induced CEO Turnover, working paper 
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have incentives to grow the firm size rather than improve profitability6. Furthermore, Myers 
and Majluf (1984) also suggest that managers have incentives to raise equity and invest in 
negative NPV projects if they consider the equity overvalued and expect the loss from the 
unprofitable investment to be offset by the gain from issuing equity above its intrinsic value. 
This is closely related to the degree from asymmetric information, which we describe in the 
subsequent section. Lastly, the wealth-transfer-effect hypothesis, presented by Galai and 
Masulis (1976), suggests that an unexpected reduction in leverage due to an equity capital 
raise, transfer wealth from shareholders to debtholders. They argue that debtholders gain since 
they still receive the same risk-premium even though the riskiness of the debt is reduced.  
3.2.2 Asymmetric information 
Besides having incentives to alter a firm’s capital structure at the expense of the debt and 
equity holders, managers are also likely to hold superior information about the firm and its 
future cash flows relative to that of outside investors (Berk and DeMarzo, 2017). In such 
instances, there exists a level of asymmetric information between managers and investors, 
which further may motivate managers to take specific actions in modifying the capital 
structure. Below, we discuss some of these complications in relation to equity issuances. 
Adverse selection 
Adverse selection is a result of information divergence between seller and buyer. Arkelof 
(1970) refers to adverse selection as the lemon principle, in which the seller of a good holds 
superior information to that of the buyer, hence the buyer is only willing to buy the good at a 
discounted price. Even though this is a general principle for any setting in which the seller 
holds superior information, it is highly relevant in the equity capital market as the insiders 
often hold superior information to that of outside investors. For instance, considering that a 
large existing shareholder (or some of the managers) decides to sell a significant stake of its 
ownership for various reasons, outside investors may then question the firm prospects as one 
would expect the insiders to hold superior information. Consequently, outside investors lower 
the price that they are willing to pay for the equity, as they require compensation for the 
increased uncertainty. The theory could help to partly explain the discounts observed in 
 
6 According to Berk and DeMarzo (2017), one potential reason is that managers in larger firms have higher salaries. 
Additionally, they may be attracted to the prestige of running larger companies as well as more publicity. 
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connection to equity offerings where managers are selling equity on behalf of the firm. The 
issue discount acts as a cost of issuing equity, and owners with good information may thus 
refrain from issuing equity. This again leads us to the same lemons problem, as only managers 
that know the security has a low value will sell, hence investors are only willing to acquire the 
offered shares at a discount (Berk and DeMarzo, 2017).   
Market timing and signalling effects 
The market timing hypothesis describes how managers preferred choice of financing may 
depend on whether they believe their equity is under – or overvalued. If managers consider 
the market to be overly optimistic about future growth prospects, they have incentives to issue 
overvalued equity. Should however the management have the impression that their equity is 
undervalued, their preferred choice of financing would rather be cash on the balance (if 
available) or debt. Managers’ choice of financing is also closely linked to the theory about the 
signalling effect, which describes how investors consider the management to be the superior 
source of information and thus can invest according to the action taken by the management. 
Since investors often expect the management to be positively biased, they have to credibly 
signal its knowledge about the firm to convince the market. The theory suggests that the use 
of leverage might more credibly signal valuable growth prospects than the use of equity, as 
the firm then might be at risk of defaulting if these growth opportunities are non-existing. In 
other words, the actions might be too costly to take if the claims were untrue (Berk and 
DeMarzo, 2017). 
Consistent with the idea that debt offerings might credibly signal more valuable growth 
prospects, Myers (1984) suggests that managers would prefer to use retained earnings as their 
choice of financing, and only equity as a last resort, referred to as the pecking order theory. 
The hypothesis can be said to be supported by aggregate data on corporate finance, showing 
that firms are net repurchases, rather than issuers, of equity. The opposite trend is observed 
for debt offerings. Moreover, only 10% of firms’ capex needs have on average been financed 
through external capital, supporting the view of retained earnings being the preferred source 
of financing (Berk and DeMarzo, 2017; Federal Reserve, 2015). 
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3.3 Theoretical example of change in firm value upon SEO 
announcement 
As described in Section 2.1, at the time of the SEO announcement, firms typically disclose the 
main motive of the of the equity offering. However, for various reasons, some firms choose to 
be more ambiguous than others. According to Walker and Yost (2008), firms may bear 
strategic costs of revealing specifics in cases where; the information is useful to rivals, 
proceeds are used to increase liquidity to have the flexibility to take on future growth 
opportunities, or where the management tends to engage in agency spending. Conversely, 
firms raising proceeds for projects that are more valuable than the market is currently 
considering as the marginal benefit of new projects have incentives to reveal specific 
information about its investment plans. Following Walker and Yost (2008) and Myers and 
Majluf (1984), we provide a mathematical description of the theoretical market reaction upon 
the announcement of seasoned equity offerings in relation to what type of information the 
issuing firms choose to reveal. The illustration assumes that the growth prospect of a company 
is known and that the market will make unbiased value estimation based on the information 
revealed. We also assume that firms have only good projects or only bad projects to invest in.  
In the first equation, we assume that no firms reveal specific information in the equity offering. 
RH and RL are the rates of return on the good and bad projects, respectively. Furthermore, we 
assume that RH > RL and RH > 1.  D is the probability assessed by the market of whether the 
projects are good or bad, and firms must raise capital I to invest in the specific projects. Then 
the expected change in value ∆V for firm j is: 
∆𝑉𝑗 = >D𝑅𝐻 + (1 − D)𝑅𝐿 − 1@ 𝐼𝑗    Eq. (1) 
Next, we assume that the market is capable of identifying good and bad projects if the firm 
chooses to disclose specifics. However, we also assume that some firms with value-creating 
projects choose to not reveal specific information for various strategic reasons. Thus, when a 
firm chooses to reveal a good project, the market will assign D = 1, leaving us with the 
following equation for these issuers: 
∆𝑉𝑗 = >𝑅𝐻 − 1@ 𝐼𝑗     Eq. (2) 
From Equation (1) and (2), we see that firms with good projects available will choose to 
disclose information on their intended use of proceeds, unless having a strategic reason for 
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doing otherwise (Eq. (2) greater than Eq. (1)). Conversely, we would expect firms with bad 
projects (or having strategic reasons) to be ambiguous.  
Further, assuming that only some firms reveal specific information and that δ is the probability 
that a non-revealing firm has a good project, the equation for firms that do not reveal will be: 
∆𝑉𝑗 = >G𝑅𝐻 + (1 − G)𝑅𝐿 − 1@ 𝐼𝑗    Eq. (3) 
and if a firm with bad projects reveals specifics, the change in value is: 
∆𝑉𝑗 = >𝑅𝐿 − 1@ 𝐼𝑗     Eq. (4) 
From Equation (3) and (4), we can then see that firms with bad projects are better off by not 
disclosing specific information as long as δ > 0. Assuming that some firms with good projects 
will be ambiguous due to various strategic reasons, the market is likely to reflect δ > 0, hence 
we expect these issuers to disclose more vague statements on the intended use of proceeds.  
Although this is a simplified illustration, it provides us with a theoretical fundament when 
analysing stock price reactions to the announcement of seasoned equity offerings in Section 
7.2. In practice, most firms reveal some information on the intended use of proceeds, hence it 
is much about how compelling the managers are in its strategic communication with the 
market. However, we still argue that this theoretical concept suits well when distinguishing 
between issuers revealing specifics about its investment plans and issuers that disclose more 
vague investment reasons for the capital raise. In these cases, the market participants need to 
evaluate the probability of whether these investment projects take place, as well as how 
profitable the projects are likely to be. 
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4. Literature review and hypothesis development 
In this paper, we intend to examine the link between ex ante stated use of proceeds and stock 
price dynamics around issuances of seasoned equity. While there exists extensive research on 
SEOs, the existing literature on the effect of the stated intended use of proceeds is more 
limited. A reason for this might be explained by a general perception that prospectus 
disclosures in many cases are somewhat ambiguous, which in turn would make it hard to draw 
any interference. In this section we review some of the existing literature related to our topics 
as well as presenting the expectations for the empirical results in Section 7 and 8. 
4.1 Intended use of proceeds and stock price reaction to 
SEO announcements 
The general market reaction to SEO announcements has been widely studied by academics, 
where most of the existing literature documents negative abnormal returns around the 
announcement date. Eckbo and Masulis (1992) find evidence of an average announcement 
effect of -3.1% for industrial firms issuing seasoned common stock, consistent with most 
findings of negative abnormal announcement returns of 2-3%. Masulis and Korwar (1986) 
document a significant decline in prices of common stock at the announcement of primary and 
combination stock offerings. The study emphasises the strong stock price runup prior to the 
announcement, suggesting that managers are timing the offerings. Moreover, they find that 
announcement returns are negatively associated with changes in managers’ holdings in 
connection to an offering. Their findings are supported by Asquith and Mulling (1986) and 
are generally consistent with the agency theory and the signalling model. Furthermore, Jung 
et al. (1996) support the agency model in explaining the negative market reaction to equity 
offering announcements. They provide evidence that firms without valuable investment 
opportunities experience more negative stock price reactions, and that some firms issue equity 
to benefit management at the expense of shareholders. Denis (1994) provide results consistent 
with the findings of a positive relationship between ex ante measures on profitable growth 
opportunities and announcement returns. However, they suggest that investment opportunities 
play a minor role in explaining the market reaction, as their results appear to be driven by a 
small subset of young, high growth firms. Moreover, Gao and Ritter (2010) and Autore et al. 
(2009) document that accelerated offers suffer from lower announcement returns relative to 
fully marketed offers. Autore et al. (2009) find abnormal announcement returns of -2.6% and 
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-1.7% for accelerated offers and fully marketed offers, respectively. Also, when controlling 
for various proxies on asymmetric information, they find that accelerated offers on average 
achieve significantly lower announcement returns relative to fully marketed offers. They 
suggest that the market discrimination upon the announcment may be related to the signalling 
effect of equity offerings. In the presence of asymmetric information between the management 
and the market, they argue that managers have incentives to choose an accelerated offer in 
order to avoid disclosing unfavourable information during the due diligence process. 
Conversely, Bortolotti et al. (2008) find that accelerated offers on average experience higher 
SEO announcement returns relative to public offerings. Hertzel and Lemmon (2002) find 
positive announcement effects for private placements, despite large offer price discounts. 
Also, using an aggregated sample of several studies across various countries, Eckbo (2007) 
find that the average market reaction to private placements is consistently positive, suggesting 
that the market expects these firms to benefit from targeting certain large investors through 
higher ownership concentration, increased monitoring services and/or expert advice. 
A study by Walker and Yost (2008), which is closely related to our study on disclosed 
information on the intended use of proceeds and announcement returns, find that the market 
reacts more favourably to firms revealing specifics for the use of capital soon-to-be raised. 
Using a sample of 438 SEOs in the US, the mean two-day cumulative abnormal return around 
the announcement of the offering is -2.8%. When dividing the offering firms into subgroups 
of investment, general and refinancing motives, they find that firms stating investment motives 
experience on average abnormal announcement returns of -2.2%, while issuers stating general 
or refinancing exhibit abnormal returns of -3.2% and -3.3%, respectively. Controlling for other 
ex ante factors, they find large and positive coefficients for investment firms, while refinancing 
firms have large and negative coefficients. They also find that announcement returns for firms 
revealing specific investment plans are positively related to the anticipated size of the 
investment, supporting that agency issues are important factors in SEOs. A more recent study 
is conducted by Silva and Bilinski (2015) on 1,546 seasoned equity offerings in the UK. 
Although primarily focusing on long-term post-issue performance, they find that issuers 
stating specific investment motives experience cumulative abnormal announcement returns of 
2.7% when using a five-day event window surrounding the announcement date. Moreover, 
they find that issuers stating general and recapitalisation purposes on average experience 
announcement returns of 0.0% and -2.6%, respectively. They conclude that prospectus 
information on the intended use of proceeds can help investors in determining better SEO 
 26
prospects. Also, a closely related study on announcement returns and offer price discounts for 
SEOs on the Oslo Stock Exchange is conducted by Width and Årseth (2018). They find that 
firms revealing specific investment motives upon the announcement exhibit lower offer price 
discounts and accordingly more favourable market reactions relative to ambiguous issuers. 
Additionally, they find that firms raising equity for refinancing reasons suffer the most from 
poor announcement returns. They suggest that ambiguous issuers, or those with a pure capital 
structure motive, are more likely to take advantage of asymmetric information to transfer 
wealth from new to existing shareholders. 
Based on previous evidence, we expect the disclosure of the intended use of proceeds to have 
a significant impact on the market reaction to the announcement of seasoned equity offerings. 
Specifically, we hypothesise firms revealing specific investment motives to credibly signal 
that proceeds are to be raised for a value-increasing manner. As a result, we anticipate these 
issuers to exhibit more favourable market reactions relative to that of ambiguous issuers. We 
further expect the market to be somewhat cautious when the primary motivation of the equity 
issue is left vague, indicating that these issuers may be more likely to mask less favourable 
firm conditions or take advantage of periods of temporary overvaluation. Finally, due to 
usually distressed conditions, we expect issuers with refinancing motives to suffer from large 
offer price discounts to ensure successfully completions of the offerings, and consequently 
poor announcement returns relative to the other sub-categories of intended use of proceeds. 
4.2 Intended use of proceeds and long-run post-issue 
market performance 
Consistent with the more well-known long-run stock underperformance following initial 
public offerings, shares of follow-on offerings have later been widely documented to 
underperform in the subsequent years as well, referred to as “the new issue puzzle”. Studying 
large samples of seasoned equity offerings in the US, Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995) and 
Loughran and Ritter (1997) document that issuing firms perform poorly relative to non-issuing 
firms following an equity issue. They find that issuing firms underperform non-issuers by 20-
30% over a three-to five-year period when matched on size and book-to-market ratio. They 
suggest that managers announce offerings of seasoned equity when the stock is overvalued 
and that the market does not reveal the stock appropriately, hence the stock is still overvalued 
when issued. Supportive evidence is provided by Eberhart and Siddique (2002) and Burch et 
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al. (2004). However, Eckbo et al. (2000) argue that equity issuers lower the systematic risk 
exposure relative to matched non-issuers, not captured by the matched-firm technique which 
has been commonly applied to measure long-run abnormal returns following equity offerings. 
Additionally, they argue that issuing firms exhibit higher post-issue stock liquidity and reduces 
bankruptcy risk, hence lowering the expected returns. Using factor-models on a large US 
sample, they find insignificantly negative abnormal returns for firms conducting seasoned 
equity offerings. Consequently, they conclude that the “new issues puzzle” may be explained 
by a failure of the matched-firm technique to adequately adjust for differences in systematic 
risk between the SEO firms and the non-issuing control firms. Another rationale explanation 
of the observed stock price dynamics around seasoned equity offerings, is that expected returns 
are time-varying when proceeds are raised for investments. As the execution of a specific 
investment may be flexible in time, the investment can be viewed as a real option, hence upon 
exercise the required return would decrease as options on assets are riskier than the assets 
itself. Given that such growth options only will be exercised when moving sufficiently in-the-
money, the model explains both the pre-issue price runup and the subsequent long-run 
underperformance (Carlson et al., 2006). 
In a paper more closely related to that of our, Autore et al. (2009) study the relationship 
between ex ante stated use of proceeds and post-issue stock performance of seasoned equity 
offerings in the US, using both the matched-firm technique with buy-and-hold abnormal 
returns and factor-models. Regardless of the stated use of proceeds, they find evidence of poor 
long-run market performance for SEO firms, with a mean buy-and-hold abnormal return of -
14% over a three-year period subsequent to the offerings. Further, consistent with the rationale 
that firms revealing specifics are more credibly signalling that proceeds will be used for a 
value-increasing manner, they do not find any subsequent abnormal stock performance for 
issuers disclosing specific investment motives. In contrast, they find evidence of poor long-
run post-issue stock returns for issuers stating that proceeds are raised for general or 
refinancing purposes, with buy-and-hold abnormal returns of -12% and -21%, respectively. 
Moreover, when using time-series regressions, they do not find any significant 
underperformance for issuers stating investment or general motives. However, the poor post-
issue performance for refinancing firms is still severe, with an annualised abnormal return of 
-8.9% over the subsequent three-year period. They suggest that issuers revealing vague 
prospectus disclosures, or those who intend to alter the capital structure, are more likely to be 
opportunistic market-timers. Silva and Bilinski (2015) find relatively similar results when 
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studying seasoned equity offerings in the UK. Using a three-year horizon, they provide 
evidence of no abnormal post-issue performance for firms disclosing investment purposes as 
the main motive for the capital raise, while general and recapitalisation firms on average 
exhibit negative ex post abnormal stock returns, suggesting that investors can use prospectus 
disclosure on the intended use of proceeds to identify firms with better post-offering prospects. 
Conversely, Jeanneret (2005) documents that French SEO firms revealing specifics about its 
investment plans underperform significantly over a three-year period following an issuance of 
seasoned equity, while issuers intending to modify the capital structure do not exhibit any ex 
post abnormal stock performance. He argues that pure recapitalisation offerings are subject to 
the capital structure irrelevancy theory, while investment firms are more likely to take 
advantage of overly optimistic market expectations. 
Based on the previous literature on long-run post-issue market performance, we expect that 
firms disclosing specific investment motives are more likely to issue equity in response of 
arising growth opportunities and subsequently exhibit no abnormal stock returns. Moreover, 
we hypothesise that more ambiguous managers to a greater extent have a timing motive or 
intend to engage in agency spending, resulting in initial overpricing and a subsequent long-
run underperformance when investors correct this initial mispricing over time. For issuers 
stating refinancing motives, we expect the long-run post-issue performance to be more a 
binary case as many of these issuers are in severe financial distress. 
4.3 Intended use of proceeds and post-issue operating 
performance 
Consistent with the poor stock performance following seasoned equity offerings, the existing 
literature also finds that firms conducting SEOs tend to experience a subsequent deterioration 
in the operating performance. Studying a sample of 1,338 SEOs in the US, Loughran and 
Ritter (1997) find that the median return on assets for issuing firms declines from 6.3% to 
3.2% over a four-year period. They also find that the pre-issue operating performance for 
issuing firms is better than that of a control group, and that the performance peaks around the 
time of the equity offering, suggesting that the poor post-issue stock returns reflect 
overextrapolation by investors of the pre-issue trend in operating performance. These findings 
are generally consistent with the timing theory as well as the arguments made by Jung et al. 
(1996), who suggest that overconfident managers, or managers suffering from “empire-
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building” biases, are investing heavily in a value-decreasing manner. A notable exception from 
poor operating performance following seasoned equity offerings in the existing literature is 
Walker and Yost (2008). In line with previous research, they find that issuers experience a 
decline in the unadjusted operating performance. However, they argue that industry-effects 
play an important role as they find evidence that the industry-adjusted operating performance 
either improves or remains unchanged over a three-year period following the offering. Also 
Hertzel and Lemmon (2002) find that the operating performance does not change significantly 
over the post-issue period, but rather remains weak from poor pre-issue levels, suggesting that 
investors might be overly optimistic about a turnaround in the performance of the existing 
assets in place. 
Moreover, Autore et al. (2009) conduct a similar study as our, investigating the relationship 
between post-issue operating performance and disclosed information on the intended use of 
proceeds. The study provides evidence of a post-issue decline in operating performance for 
firms stating recapitalisation or general corporate purposes as the main motive for the equity 
offering. However, they do not find evidence of long-run underperformance for issuers stating 
specific investment motives. Moreover, Walker and Yost (2008) also divide the operating 
performance into use of proceeds classifications. They document that, regardless of the ex ante 
stated intentions, firms engage in large investment programs financed by both debt and equity. 
They also find that providing the investors with sufficient information matters, as firms that 
are more specific about its investment plans generally perform better than firms that are more 
ambiguous, supporting the view that agency issues are an important factor in SEOs. 
Consistent with previous literature and our hypothesis on long-run post-issue stock 
performance, we expect the operating performance for firms revealing specific investment 
motives to either improve or remain unchanged, as these are considered more likely to credibly 
reveal its intention to issue equity to take on profitable investments. For issuers stating vague 
investment or general purposes, we hypothesise relatively poor post-issue operating 
performance, reflecting that some issuers may mask unfavourable firm prospects or are over-
investing in a value-decreasing manner. Lastly, since many of the issuers stating refinancing 
needs are concerned about meeting its debt commitments in distressed conditions, we expect 
the ex post operating performance to improve for the surviving firms, but still remain relatively 
weak as a turnaround of the existing assets may take time to materialise in improved earnings. 
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5. Data, sample selection and use of proceeds 
classification 
5.1 Data and sample selection criteria 
The initial data on equity issuances are obtained from Dealogic Equity Capital Markets, 
consisting of deal-specific characteristics for all equity transactions in the Norwegian capital 
market during the period 2000-2018. We favour Dealogic due to more accurate data relative 
to alternative databases (Geo and Ritter, 2010). This data also includes detailed descriptions 
of the stated intended use of proceeds. For accounting data and stock prices, we use the 
Datastream database. Moreover, to validate and collect further information on the intended 
use of proceeds, issue and announcement dates, and other deal-specific data, we manually 
examine all the relevant transactions in Newsweb7. Our original dataset includes 1,392 equity 
transactions. Further, we exclude offerings based on the following criteria:  
1) Listings on Merkur Market and Oslo Axess – We exclude all listings on Merkur Market 
and Oslo Axess, hence our dataset only includes equity offerings on the Oslo Stock 
Exchange main market. This is primarily due to insufficient transaction data on many of 
these offerings. We further argue that the low trading volume in many of these issuers’ 
stocks may disturb our data, hence potentially leading to misinterpretations. A total of 192 
equity transactions are removed from the initial sample. 
2) Convertible bonds and IPOs – Our paper is exclusively focusing on seasoned equity 
offerings, hence we exclude all offerings of convertible bonds as well as initial public 
offerings. Another 204 offerings are excluded from the dataset. 
3) Secondary offerings – As described in Section 2.1, secondary offerings are already 
outstanding shares sold to the public by existing shareholders, hence these do not raise any 
proceeds for the issuing firm. Due to our focus on seasoned equity offerings in relation to 
the stated intended use of proceeds, these offerings are not meaningful to include. We 
therefore restrict our data to offerings of primary shares or issuances that have at least 
some primary component (a combination of primary- and secondary shares). This further 
reduces our dataset by 211 equity offerings. 
 
7 Newsweb is the official market channel for public announcements for companies listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange. 
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4) Repair offerings - In connection with a private placement, companies can choose to issue 
a subsequent repair offering to non-participating investors in order to minimise the dilution 
of existing shareholders. These repair offerings are often of relatively small sizes and 
announced together with the initial equity issue announcement. Consequently, the 
inclusion of such offerings may potentially lead to biased statistical inference. We exclude 
a total of 130 repair offerings. 
5) Deal size – Following Corwin (2003) and Mola and Loughran (2004), we restrict our 
dataset to a minimum deal size. Studying a US sample, they set the minimum limit to USD 
20-25 million. However, considering the relatively smaller deal sizes in the Norwegian 
market, we exclude all offerings below NOK 25 million, further reducing our dataset by 
125 offerings. 
6) Inadequate data - Finally, we remove all offerings for which the price data was not 
available on Datastream or where we do not have sufficient stock price data before the 
equity issue. We require at least 126 trading days of observable stock prices prior to the 
announcement of the offering, removing another 67 offerings. 
Our main sample consists of 463 seasoned equity offerings. However, as we intend to analyse 
both SEO announcement returns and long-run post-issue performance, we make additional 
data adjustments for the specific analyses in the respective sections. 
5.2 Intended use of proceeds classification 
Following existing literature, we separate our sample offerings into different classifications of 
prospectus disclosure on the intended use of proceeds (see Walker and Yost, 2008; Autore et 
al., 2009; Silva and Bilinski, 2015). Most of the previous research uses three classifications: 
Investment, General and Refinancing. However, we find it interesting to test whether issuers 
stating specific investments differ significantly from issuers disclosing more vague investment 
motives or not. We argue that specific investment motives are more informative hence easier 
for investors to evaluate. Thus, we further divide Investment into Investment and Capex, 
leaving us with four different categories. Issuers in the first classification, Investment, are those 
that prominently state that the proceeds will be used for specific investment purposes. This 
typically relates to acquisitions of companies or operational assets. However, we require that 
the investment is specified, and that the issuer contemplates to invest shortly after the 
announcement. We have also manually cross-checked all these announced transactions, 
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confirming that these actually take place in a relatively short time following the 
announcement. Issuers in the second classification, Capex, are those that disclose more vague 
investment motives for the equity offerings. This includes statements such as future 
acquisitions (unspecified), project financing, capital expenditures, R&D etc. The third 
classification, General, refers to issuers stating that proceeds will be used for general corporate 
purposes, strengthening of the balance sheet, or to increase working capital. We also here 
include issuers that do not disclose any particular reason for the equity offering. The final 
classification, Refinancing, includes issuers intending to do a restructuring or repayment of 
outstanding debt. Due to relatively vague prospectus disclosures for many of the offerings that 
we have classified as refinancing, we did some further research outside Newsweb and 
Dealogic (using company websites and news articles) on the specific issuers. We find that a 
large proportion of these firms were clearly in financial distress at the time of the issue, hence 
to a greater extent considered as “involuntary” equity issuances. This seems to differ our 
dataset slightly from some of the related studies on larger markets, where the refinancing 
classification includes more firms seeking to optimise the capital structure. In Appendix B, we 
provide specific examples for each of the use of proceeds categories. 
5.3 Sample data 
In Figure 1, we present the number of sample SEOs over the period 2000-2018 on the Oslo 
Stock Exchange, divided into the four categories by stated intended use of proceeds. The figure 
also shows the development of the OSEBX8 over the same period. Issuers raising external 
equity capital for Capex or General purposes dominant our sample. In total, we have 222 SEOs 
where the intended use of proceeds is General, while 97 of the sample firms are classified as 
Capex. For the categories Investment and Refinancing, we have 72 observations within each 
classification. However, the composition of the different classifications has been fluctuating 
over time. Not surprisingly, issuances motivated by Investment reasons experienced a relative 
issuance peak prior to the financial crisis, with some volume coming back in the last years. On 
the contrary, the number of issuers with Refinancing motives increased significantly in the 
aftermath of the financial crisis. Also, better illustrated in Table 1, there has been a substantial  
 
8 OSEBX is a value-weighted benchmark index that comprises the most traded shares listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange 
(Oslobors.no, 2019).  
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Figure 1 – Number of sample SEOs split by the intended use of proceeds 
(2000-2018)  
Note: The chart presents the total number of SEOs in our sample split by the intended use of proceeds categories (lhs) and 
the OSEBX-index (rhs). We only include issuers listed on Oslo Stock Exchange over the period 2000-2018. 
Table 1 - Number of sample SEOs: Oil vs. Non-Oil 
 Investment Capex General Refinancing All issuers 
Time period Oil Non-oil Oil Non-oil Oil Non-oil Oil Non-oil Oil Non-oil 
Panel A: Number of SEOs per time period 
2017-18 6 6 4 12 6 20 4 5 20 43 
2015-16 0 7 0 10 6 20 7 4 13 41 
2013-14 1 1 3 7 4 14 5 3 13 25 
2011-12 0 3 3 9 9 23 2 6 14 41 
2009-10 2 4 5 11 18 31 3 18 28 64 
2007-08 7 6 7 7 6 14 1 4 21 31 
2005-06 9 13 7 2 11 19 2 2 29 36 
2003-04 1 3 2 3 6 7 0 4 9 17 
2000-02 0 3 0 5 2 6 0 2 2 16 
Total 26 46 31 66 68 154 24 48 149 314 
Panel B: Percent of total number of SEOs within each time period 
2017-18 10 % 10 % 6 % 19 % 10 % 32 % 6 % 8 % 32 % 68 % 
2015-16 0 % 13 % 0 % 19 % 11 % 37 % 13 % 7 % 24 % 76 % 
2013-14 3 % 3 % 8 % 18 % 11 % 37 % 13 % 8 % 34 % 66 % 
2011-12 0 % 5 % 5 % 16 % 16 % 42 % 4 % 11 % 25 % 75 % 
2009-10 2 % 4 % 5 % 12 % 20 % 34 % 3 % 20 % 30 % 70 % 
2007-08 13 % 12 % 13 % 13 % 12 % 27 % 2 % 8 % 40 % 60 % 
2005-06 14 % 20 % 11 % 3 % 17 % 29 % 3 % 3 % 45 % 55 % 
2003-04 4 % 12 % 8 % 12 % 23 % 27 % 0 % 15 % 35 % 65 % 
2000-02 0 % 17 % 0 % 28 % 11 % 33 % 0 % 11 % 11 % 89 % 
Total 6% 10% 7% 14% 15% 33% 5% 10% 32% 68% 
Note: In Panel A, we present total number of SEOs per time period of two years (three years for the period 2000-02) split by 
the intended use of proceeds. We further divide the use of proceeds classifications into oil- and non-oil related equity 
offerings. In Panel B, we report the percentage of total number of SEOs within the same time period for each defined category. 
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number of refinancing cases in the years following the plunge in oil prices in 2014. The relative 
share of oil-related firms raising equity for Refinancing reasons is considerably higher in the 
periods 2013-14 and 2015-16. Consistently, we find relatively modest investment activity with 
equity financing (Investment and Capex) for oil-related firms over the entire period 2009-2016. 
For non-oil related SEO firms, the proportion of the different use of proceeds classifications 
has been relatively stable, except in the years surrounding the financial crisis. These issuers 
raised more frequently equity for specific Investment motives during the pre-crisis period. 
However, in the years following the financial crisis, more equity offerings by non-oil related 
firms have been conducted with the stated intention of strengthening the balance sheet, 
increase liquidity or repay debt (General and Refinancing). 
In Figure 2, we present the industry-composition of our sample firms. The industry-
classification is based on the first digits in the GICS-code9, where we further divide the largest 
industry-classes into smaller sub-categories. The industry-composition for our sample is 
generally consistent with the composition on the Oslo Stock Exchange. We note that the 
sample is highly skewed towards cyclical sectors such as Oil & Gas and Transportation, 
holding 32% and 14% of the total number of SEOs, respectively. Also, Technology firms 
account for a significant proportion of the number of equity offerings in our sample. 
Figure 2 – Industry-composition of sample firms 
 
Note: The figure presents the industry-composition of the sample firms based on the first digits in the GICS-code. See 
Appendix C for industry-composition within each category of intended use of proceeds.   
 
9 The Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) is a global standard developed by MSCI and S&P Global, where listed 
firms are categorised on four levels and 11 sectors based on its most important business activity (Oslobors.no, 2019). 
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In Figure 3, we present the development in the choice of flotation method. As described in 
Section 2.4, accelerated bookbuild (or private placement) has been the preferred method of 
flotation in Norway over the entire sample period. More than 75% of the equity offerings are 
done through an accelerated process, while rights offers account for approximately 20%. Only 
a small number of the SEOs in our sample are fully marketed offers. 
Figure 3 – Number of sample SEOs per flotation method 
 
Note: The figure presents the development in number of SEOs per flotation method at OSE over the period 2000-2018. 
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6. Methodology 
In this section, we describe the different methodologies that we apply to examine the 
relationship between ex ante stated use of proceeds and SEO announcement returns as well as 
long-run post-issue stock and operating performance in Section 7 and 8. Using standard event 
methodology for analysing equity issue announcement returns, we start by defining the 
relevant windows before we explain how we derive abnormal returns over the event window. 
Additionally, we explain the intuition behind the control variables in the multivariate 
regression analysis on abnormal announcement returns. Moreover, we present two different 
methodologies for estimating long-run post-issue stock returns. Finally, we define an 
appropriate measure of the ex post operating performance and present our regression models 
to examine the relation between prospectus disclosure and change in operating performance. 
We also add a section of possible limitations to our methodologies. 
6.1 Abnormal SEO announcement returns 
6.1.1 Estimation of abnormal announcement returns 
We examine the market reaction to the announcement of seasoned equity offerings, using 
standard event study methodology. Event studies are commonly used in the literature to 
measure effects of specific corporate events. First, we start by defining the event date (t = 0). 
We consider the date of the official SEO announcement as the most appropriate event date, 
collected from Dealogic. Additionally, we have manually cross-checked these dates with the 
disclosed information in Newsweb and adjusted accordingly. Moreover, to capture the 
potential lag between SEO announcements and the market reaction, we use an event window 
somewhat wider than the exact event date. In line with Silva and Bilinski (2015), we use a 
five-day event window, starting two days prior to the announcement and ending two days after 
(-2, 2). Further, following MacKinley (1997), we use an estimation window of 251 trading 
days to estimate “normal returns”, where we require a minimum of 126 trading days with 
observable stock prices before the announcement date. Also, to avoid event-driven effects 
from interfering with the calculation of normal returns, our estimation window ends 10 days 
prior to the announcement date. The time sequence is illustrated below, where τ represents a 
multiple period event window. 
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Figure 4 – Event study 
 
We measure abnormal announcement returns as the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) over 
the event window, calculated as the cumulative difference between actual returns and 
estimated normal returns. To estimate normal returns, we use the one-factor market model as 
Kothari and Warner (2008) argue that event studies are largely immune to misspecifications 
in estimating expected returns, hence the abnormal announcement returns cannot be largely 
attributed to the “bad model” problem. The one-factor market model is also the preferred 
model in related studies by Walker and Yost (2008) and Corwin (2003), as well as being 
considered to be the most accurate model to calculate normal returns in a meta-study by Holler 
(2012). Specifically, using Ordinary Least Square regressions (OLS), we regress excess 
returns for each stock of the issuing firms on excess returns from the value-weighted OSE All-
share index (OSEAX)10. All returns are collected from the Datastream database. We apply the 
following steps to estimate cumulative abnormal announcement returns: 
(i)  Normal performance return model 
The linear specifications in the one-factor market model follow from the assumed joint 
normality of stock returns. For any security i, the model is specified: 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡     Eq. (5) 
𝐸(𝜀𝑖𝑡) = 0                𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝜀𝑖𝑡) = 𝜎𝜀𝑖
2  
where Rit and Rmt are returns in excess of the risk-free rate in period t on security i and the 
market portfolio m, respectively, while εit is the zero mean error term. αi, βi and σεi2 are the 
parameters in the one-factor market model. 
 
 
10 The OSE All-share index (OSEAX) is a value-weighted stock index including all shares listed at Oslo Stock Exchange. 
The index is adjusted for dividends and other corporate-specific events. 
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(ii)  Abnormal returns 
The estimated αi and βi from Equation (5) are further used to calculate daily abnormal returns 
for each security i over the event window τ of five days surrounding the announcement date. 
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝜏 = 𝑅𝑖𝜏 − 𝛼?̂? −  𝛽?̂?𝑅𝑚𝜏      Eq. (6) 
ARiτ is the sample abnormal returns, while Riτ and Rmτ are the actual returns in excess of the 
risk-free rate for each sample security and the market portfolio. 
(iii) Aggregation of abnormal returns 
Eventually, to estimate cumulative abnormal returns we aggregate the estimated daily 
abnormal returns from Equation (6) over the defined event window τ for each security i. We 
thus accommodate a multiple period event window from τ1 to τ2. 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝜏1𝜏2), = ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖?̂?
𝜏2
𝜏= 𝜏1
                                              Eq. (7) 
Given the null distribution of abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns, tests of the 
null hypothesis can be conducted. In Appendix A, we provide a description of statistical tests 
used to evaluate the statistical significance of the CARs. 
6.1.2 Cross-sectional regression analysis 
To further examine the impact of the stated intended use of proceeds on stock price reaction 
to seasoned equity offering announcements, we run multiple cross-sectional regression models 
on abnormal announcement returns. The rationale is to test whether the potential signal effect 
of the prospectus disclosure on the intended use of proceeds persists when controlling for other 
ex ante factors. We apply the standard OLS methodology using the five-day cumulative 
abnormal return surrounding the announcement date as the dependent variable. Specifically, 
we estimate the following: 
 𝐶𝐴𝑅(−2, 2)𝑖𝑡 = α + 𝛽1 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡  
+  𝛾 ′𝑋𝑖𝑡  + 𝜀𝑖𝑡     Eq. (7) 
Capexit, Generalit and Refinancingit are dummy variables equal to 1 if the issuer states the 
specific intention of the offering, and 0 otherwise, using Investmentit as the reference group. 
Vector Xit is the set of control variables, including various deal- and issuer-specific 
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characteristics. In Section 7.1, we provide descriptive statistics for all the explanatory 
variables. All accounting data are measured at the end of the last fiscal year prior to the 
announcement of the offering.  
 
The first deal-specific control variables of interest are the binary indicators for the choice of 
flotation method (Fully Marketedit, Acceleratedit and Rightsit), as the choice of flotation 
method may signal the quality of the issue as well as being an important cost component (both 
directly and indirectly). The literature is somewhat inconsistent in its findings on how the 
market reacts to the various deal types. For instance, Loughran and Ritter (2008) find evidence 
of more favourable market reactions to fully marketed offers, while Bortolotti et al. (2008) 
suggest that accelerated offers on average experience higher SEO announcement returns. Also, 
using an aggregated sample of several studies across various countries, Eckbo (2007) finds 
that the average market reaction to private placements (accelerated offers) is consistently 
positive. Second, often related to the choice of flotation method, we control for the potential 
offer price discount (Offer Discountit), measured as the offer price relative to the closing price 
one trading day prior to the announcement. New shares are often issued at a substantial 
discount relative to the pre-issue stock price, hence the price discount should have a 
significantly negative impact on the market reaction. However, we only consider this relevant 
for accelerated offers as the offer price then typically is disclosed in the initial offering 
announcement or shortly after. We therefore include an interaction term between the offer 
price discount variable and the binary indicator for whether the issue is conducted through an 
accelerated offer (Acceleratedit*Relative Deal Sizeit). Third, we control for the relative size of 
the offering (Relative Deal Sizeit). According to the adverse selection model, larger relative 
offerings imply less favourable market reactions as the increase in the number of shares 
outstanding reduces insiders’ fractional ownership of shares (if no change in actual 
shareholdings). However, we also suggest that firms managing to raise more capital relative 
to its current market value may indicate better growth prospects, in particular for those 
intending to raise capital swiftly to grasp arising growth opportunities. Another important 
element is the expected shareholder takeup in rights offerings. Although, the relative deal size 
is not directly measuring the expected shareholder takeup, it might still proxy the proportion 
of existing shareholders that will sell their rights to outside investors due to wealth and 
portfolio constraints. As a resolution to the rights offer paradox, Eckbo and Masulis (1992) 
argue that the adverse selection risk increases with lower expected shareholder takeup, hence 
it may be more optimal to add quality certification through underwriting. To partly control for 
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some of these mentioned factors, we include an interaction term between the relative deal size 
variable and the binary variable for accelerated offer (Acceleratedit*Relative Deal Sizeit). 
Further, we add variables for various issuer-/stock-specific characteristics. First, we control 
for firm size (Market Valueit), measured as the market value one day prior to the SEO 
announcement. The rational is to control for potential adverse selection as larger firms are 
more closely followed by investors and analysts (Kim and Purnanandam, 2006). Second, we 
include a variable for book-to-market ratio (BMit), measured as the book equity in the fiscal 
year prior to announcement scaled by pre-announcement market value. Jung et al. (1996) find 
evidence that SEO announcement returns are positively related to “growth”, using the book-
to-market ratio a proxy for growth opportunities. The variable may also proxy the under- or 
overvaluation, hence it should have a cautious interpretation. Similarly, we include the pre-
announcement stock run-up (Runupit), measured as the two-months abnormal return prior to 
the equity issue announcement, controlling for potential stock overvaluation, consistent with 
the market timing literature. Moreover, we include stock volatility prior to the SEO 
announcement (Volatilityit), measured over 62 trading days prior to the announcement, as 
higher volatility in the pre-issue period may suggest greater uncertainty around the intrinsic 
value of the issuer’s stock. Another potentially important control variable is stock turnover 
(Stock Turnoverit), measured as the average stock turnover over the six months prior to the 
SEO announcement. Dierkens (1991) argue that higher trading intensity is associated with 
lower asymmetric information, suggesting that more liquid stocks should suffer less from 
negative market reactions to such announcements. Lastly, we add a binary variable for whether 
the firm has issued equity within the last 365 days prior the offering (Recent Issueit). The 
rationale is to control for that issuers may be willing to leave money on the table in earlier 
issuances to raise demand for equity offerings at a later stage when additional funding is 
needed (Jegadeesh et al., 1993). 
Eventually, we add explanatory variables for issuer-specific financial characteristics. Firstly, 
we control for the pre-issue return on assets ratio (ROAit), measured as net income scaled by 
total assets in the last fiscal year prior to the announcement of the offering. We use this variable 
as a proxy of the marginal benefit of new investments. Additionally, the variable measures the 
pre-issue operating performance, which may further help investors in considering the validity 
of the disclosed information on intended use of proceeds. Moreover, we control for potentially 
inflated earnings in the pre-issue period. We measure this as the relative amount of reported 
discretionary accruals (Accrualsit), defined as net income minus operating cash flow scaled by 
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total assets. The rationale follows from Teoh et al. (1998), who find that cash flows from 
operations on average decline prior to seasoned equity offerings, while reported discretionary 
accruals cause earnings to peak around the offering dates, consistent with the timing and 
overconfidence hypothesis. Finally, we control for pre-issue leverage (Leverageit) and the 
relative amount of working capital (WC/TAit). These variables are used as proxies for financial 
slack, whereof high leverage and low working capital may restrict management’s discretion 
and reduce agency spending (Kim and Purnanandam, 2006). However, we also argue that 
firms with high leverage and/or low working capital level when deciding to raise equity may 
indicate less favourable firm prospects or an immediate need of liquidity where external equity 
capital may be the only viable alternative. 
6.2 Long-run post-issue abnormal stock returns 
Further, we provide a description of the methodologies that we use to examine the relation 
between prospectus disclosure on the intended use of proceeds and subsequent long-run stock 
performance. Both time-series regressions and the matched-firm technique are commonly 
applied by academics when investigating long-run post-issue abnormal returns. Loughran and 
Ritter (2000) argue that time-series regressions generally have low power to detect abnormal 
returns because it averages over periods with high and low event activity. However, time-
series regressions alleviate some concerns around the matched-firm techniques. Firstly, the 
approach avoids the autocorrelation problems related to the cross-correlation among returns 
across clustered events (Kothari and Warner, 2006). The method is therefore preferred when 
return-calculations involve overlapping events. Furthermore, Eckbo et al. (2000) and Brav et 
al. (2000) argue that the matched-firm technique does not properly control for differences in 
risk between the sample issuer and the control firm. They particularly emphasise how the 
methodology fails to adjust for the change in expected returns for the issuing firms as raising 
equity lower the exposure towards unexpected inflation and reduces bankruptcy risk. 
Additionally, they argue that issuers often experience increased stock liquidity which may 
further reduce the expected returns. However, for robustness, we measure the long-run 
abnormal market performance using both the matched-firm technique and time-series 
regressions. To avoid the problem of overlapping event windows, we follow Eckbo et al. 
(2000) and include only the first equity offering in an overlapping event window. We measure 
long-run abnormal returns using a period of 36 months subsequent to the equity offering, hence 
we exclude all firms that have issued equity after 2015. Furthermore, due to only a small 
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number of sample SEOs in 2000 and 2001, we limit our data to SEOs conducted in the period 
2002-2015. The higher data requirements reduce our sample to 278 SEOs.  
6.2.1 Matched-firm technique 
The first approach we use to measure long-run post-issue returns, is the matched-firm 
technique. The method measures abnormal returns by adjusting sample returns for returns of 
matched firms that are not subject to the event. To do so, we create a pool of matching 
candidates, consisting of all firms that have been listed on Oslo Stock Exchange since 200211. 
Note that we also include the sample firms as these may be used as matching firms outside its 
respective post-event windows. Following Eckbo et al. (2000), we match firms on book-to-
market ratio and firm size. Other studies also restrict the matched firms to be within the same 
industry as the issuers in order to capture potential industry effects (see Jeanneret, 2005; 
Autore et al., 2009). Since our sample is highly skewed towards cyclical industries, we argue 
that the industry-restriction is important to select matching firms with similar systematic risk. 
Though, we are aware that the relatively small market size of the Norwegian equity market 
reduces the matching power. We use the first two digits in the GICS-code to divide the firms 
into different industry classifications. However, for the largest categories, such as Energy, we 
use the first four digits in the GICS-code. The selection of the matching firms is thus based on 
three criteria: (i) the matching firm does not issue equity within the issuer’s post-event window 
of 36 months; (ii) the matching firm is within the same industry-class as the issuer; and (iii) 
the matching firm minimises the distance to the issuing firm based on book-to-market ratio 
and market value. If the matching firm is delisted during the post-event window, we use the 
next closest non-event firm from the pool. To avoid weighing one variable more than the other, 
we follow Jeanneret (2005) and apply the following formula for criteria (iii): 
𝑑𝑖,0 = √
(𝑀𝑉𝑖,0 − 𝑀𝑉𝑐,0)2
𝜎2𝑀𝑉
+
(𝐵𝑀𝑖,0 − 𝐵𝑀𝑐,0)2
𝜎2𝐵𝑀
                                Eq. (9) 
where di,0 is the distance measure between the issuing firm i and the non-issuing firm c. MV 
is the market value at the end of the month prior to the equity issue. BM is the book-to-market 
 
11 Our pool of matching candidates consists of 490 different firms that have been listed on Oslo Stock Exchange during the 
period 2002-2018. 
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ratio measured as book value at the end of the fiscal year prior to the offering divided by the 
market value at the end of the month prior to the offering. σ2MV and σ2BM are the variances of 
the series of the variables MV and BM for relevant non-issuers in the pool of matching firms.  
Once all issuing firms are matched on the mentioned criteria, we measure long-run abnormal 
post-issue performance using buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs). Kothari and Warner 
(2006) argue that the method better measures investor experience as it uses geometric returns 
rather than unrealistic rebalancing assumptions. They further argue that the use of cumulative 
abnormal returns (CARs) leads to positively biased results. As we focus on long-run post-
issue performance in relation to prospectus disclosure, we compute the average BHAR for 
each defined class of intended use of proceeds. The formula is as follows: 
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑇 = ∑ 𝑤𝑖 [∏(1 + 𝑅𝑆𝐸𝑂,𝑖𝑡) − ∏(1 + 𝑅𝑐,𝑖𝑡)
𝑇
𝑡=1
𝑇
𝑡=1
]
𝑛𝑇
𝑖=1
                          Eq. (10) 
where RSEO,it is the stock return for the issuing firm i at time t, while Rc,it is the stock return for 
the matching firm c. nT is the number of issuing firms at month T.  Since the market value for 
our sample of SEO firms is highly skewed to the right (see descriptive statistics in Section 
7.1), we only measure average BHARs on an equally-weighted basis as the value-weighted 
portfolio returns are driven by a very limited number of larger issuers. Loughran and Ritter 
(2000) also argue that value-weighted portfolio returns have low power to detect abnormal 
returns following managerial actions.  
For statistical inference, we report conventional t-statistics and non-parametric Wilcoxon sign 
test statistics. We provide a mathematical description of these statistical tests in Appendix A. 
6.2.2 Time-series regressions 
As an alternative approach to measure long-run abnormal stock performance, we use time-
series regressions. Starting in January 2002, each calendar month we construct portfolios of 
firms conducting equity offerings based on the ex ante stated use of proceeds. The firms enter 
the portfolios in the month subsequent to the equity offerings and exit after 36 months or if 
delisted12 (if sooner). The portfolios are rebalanced monthly as firms enter and exit. Again, we 
 
12 Following Silva and Bilinski (2015), we include delisted companies to avoid survivorship bias. 
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only consider equal-weighted portfolios due to the right-skewed distribution of firm size for 
our sample. The beta pricing model of primary interest is the one-factor market model in 
Equation (11), where we regress excess portfolio returns on excess returns on the market 
portfolio. However, for robustness, we include two additional factors in Equation (12), similar 
to the Fama-French three-factor model (Fama and French, 1998). All factors are obtained from 
Ødegaard’s website for asset pricing data on Oslo Stock Exchange13.  
Rpt = αp + βp[MKTt] + εpt      Eq. (11) 
Rpt = αp + βp[MKTt] + sp[SMBt] + hp[HMLt] + εpt   Eq. (12) 
Rpt is monthly portfolio returns in excess of the risk-free rate. MKTt is excess returns on the 
OSE All-share Index, SMBt is the average return on a portfolio long small stocks and short big 
stocks, and HMLt is the average return on a portfolio long high book-to-market stocks and 
short low book-to-market stocks. Our main focus is the estimated intercepts (αit), which 
present the monthly abnormal post-issue stock returns.  
Furthermore, Eckbo et al. (2000) find that the widely documented long-run post-issue 
abnormal performance is due to incomplete correction for standard benchmark adjustments 
when using the matched-firm technique. The matched-firm technique assumes that the non-
issuing control firms capture the true risk characteristics of SEO firms. To test this, they 
suggest creating a zero-investment portfolio that is long the stocks of SEO firms and short the 
stocks of matched non-issuing firms, hence effectively combining the asset pricing and 
matched-firm techniques. We follow this and create zero-investment portfolios for each sub-
category of the intended use of proceeds. The regression models follow the same specifications 
as in Equation (11) and (12). Thus, if the estimated intercepts are significantly different from 
zero, the abnormal performance from the matched-firm technique cannot be fully attributed to 
incomplete adjustments for differences in systematic risk between the issuing firms and the 
control firms. 
 
13 Bernt Arne Ødegaard - OSE asset pricing data. Retrieved from: 
http://finance.bi.no/~bernt/financial_data/ose_asset_pricing_data/index.html 
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6.3 Cross-sectional analysis of ex post operating 
performance 
To provide corroborating evidence that prospectus disclosure may help investors in 
distinguishing SEOs with better post-offering prospects, we also examine the relationship 
between ex ante stated use of proceeds and ex post operating performance. Following Walker 
and Yost (2008) and Autore et al. (2009), we report both unadjusted and adjusted performance 
measures. We analyse the median values rather than mean values due to potentially extreme 
outliers and the very skewed distribution of the accounting data. Barber and Lyon (1996) also 
find that the use of nonparametric tests consistently provides more powerful results when 
analysing operating firm performance. 
Specifically, we focus on return on assets (ROA), measured as net income scaled by total 
assets. We use two techniques to more properly control for important factors affecting the 
operating performance. The first approach follows from Autore et al. (2009), where we 
compute industry-adjusted return on assets ratios. From the issuer’s ROA, we subtract the 
median industry ROA in each particular year. The median industry levels are based on the first 
two digits in the GICS-code (four first digits for the largest industry classifications), similar 
to what we did in Section 6.2.1. Consequently, we control for important industry effects that 
are likely to have a meaningful impact on the post-issue operating performance. The second 
approach follows from Barber and Lyon (1996), who use a matching scheme based on both 
industry and operating performance. The intuition is to control for potential mean reversion in 
operating performance at industry level, in which the operating performance eventually may 
revert to the long-run mean of the industry. This may also effectively control for differences 
in firm strategies, investment opportunities and/or managerial skills (Holler, 2012). We thus 
match the issuing firms with control firms within the same industry with relatively similar 
operating performance around the equity offering. Again, we use the first digits in the GICS-
code to match on industry. Moreover, from the pool of non-event firms that meet the industry 
requirement, we select the firm with the closest return on assets ratio to that of the issuing firm 
in the offering year. If the return on assets ratio of the closest match deviates with more than 
10% from that of the issuer’s, we assign a missing value. We focus on changes in operating 
performance using different windows over a three-year period following the issue year. To 
select an appropriate test statistic, we follow (Holler, 2012) and use the median-based 
Wilcoxon-test, which he finds to be superior due to the occurrence of extreme outliers in 
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measures of abnormal operating performance. We provide a mathematical description of this 
test statistic in Appendix A. 
Finally, we use cross-sectional regression analysis to determine the impact of ex ante stated 
intended use of proceeds on post-issue operating performance. In line with the reasoning of 
that nonparametric tests are more powerful when analysing operating performance, we 
estimate quantile regressions rather than conventional OLS regressions. Quantile regressions 
extend the regression model to conditional quantiles, where the regression estimator 
minimizes the weighted sum of absolute residuals, making the model is thus less sensitive to 
outliers (Liu and Xiao, 2016). Following Autore et al. (2009) we employ the median (50th 
percentile) and test the significance of the coefficients using bootstrapped standard errors 
based on 1000 replications. Our dependent variable in the cross-sectional regression analysis 
is the absolute change in industry- and performance adjusted ROA described above. We 
estimate the change using two different test windows: from the issue year to two years 
following the issue, and from the issue year to three years after the issue. Specifically, we 
estimate: 
∆𝐼𝑛𝑑./𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚. 𝑎𝑑𝑗. 𝑅𝑂𝐴it = α + β1Capexit + β2Generalit + β3Refinancingit  
+𝛾′Xit + εit      Eq. (8) 
As for the cross-sectional analysis on abnormal announcement returns in Section 6.1.2, our 
explanatory variables of interest are binary indicators for the stated intended use of proceeds 
classifications, Capexit, Generalit and Refinancingit, where Investmentit is the omitted variable. 
Furthermore, we include variables to control for deal- and issuer-specific characteristics. 
Following Autore et al. (2009), we include market value (Market Valueit), as firm size may 
proxy the volatility in operating performance. For instance, larger firms tend to have more 
stable earnings, hence the change in operating performance should be controlled for the degree 
the firms are able to affect future earnings following the capital raise. Furthermore, we argue 
that the change in operating performance should be considered in light of the market 
expectations rather than on a stand-alone basis. Therefore, we add a variable for relative issue 
proceeds (Relative Deal Sizeit) as firms managing to raise large amounts of equity relative to 
its current market value may be considered to have better prospects for significant 
improvements in the operating performance. Eventually, we include the pre-issue return on 
assets ratio (Pre-Issue ROAit), measured as net income scaled by assets in the fiscal year prior 
to the equity offering. We argue that the change in operating performance should be considered 
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relative to the pre-issue level, as this may indicate the firms’ ability to improve their future 
operating performance. Although the industry-and performance-adjusted operating 
performance measures to some degree controls for potential mean reversion in the operating 
performance, Autore et al. (2009) suggest that the pre-issue operating performance may further 
alleviate concerns around this issue. Additionally, this variable may be considered as a proxy 
of the marginal benefit of new investments.  
6.4 Methodology limitations 
An event study allows for simple interpretation when measuring the effect of specific events. 
Although the method is commonly used by researches and is useful in several ways, there are 
some limitations. Below, we briefly describe some of the potential limitations and which 
assumptions we make to minimise the impact on the inference. 
Firstly, in order to interpret the reaction to the specific event as casual, we need to assume that 
the market is efficient, in which stock prices consistently reflect all available information. As 
previously addressed, existing literature however suggests that this assumption is not likely to 
hold for all securities at any time. Moreover, specific events may be foreseen or coexisting, 
which in turn could lead to biased estimates. Consequently, the observed reaction following 
an event may be wrongly attributed to the specific event given the existence of such conditions. 
In relation to SEO announcement returns, we use an event window of several days surrounding 
the announcement date to minimise the impact of market inefficiency. However, this makes 
our estimates more vulnerable to other confounding effects. 
Secondly, the choice of model to estimate the abnormal performance is likely to have a bearing 
impact on the magnitude and significance of our results. Additionally, various benchmarks are 
likely to show differences in performance, particularly over long test periods. The most proper 
estimation model may also be subject to variations over time. To make our analysis more 
robust to these concerns, we consider the results using several estimation models. 
Thirdly, our results may suffer from thin trading over the estimation and test period, in which 
some stocks have intervals with no or little trading volume. Dimson (1979) argues that thin 
trading induces bias in the OLS beta as it leads to errors in both the dependent and independent 
variables. Furthermore, when using daily stock prices, the closing price might not be recorded 
at the same time each day if the trading liquidity is low, referred to as non-synchronous trading. 
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Although the literature is somewhat inconsistent, MacKinlay et al. (1997) argue that non-
synchronous trading could lead to biased OLS estimates. 
Lastly, when analysing aggregated abnormal returns, we need to assume that the abnormal 
return of each security is uncorrelated in the cross-section. If the test periods or event dates of 
sample stocks overlap, a problem of cross-sectional dependence (i.e. clustering) may exist. 
Clustered standard errors can potentially lead to smaller standard errors compared to OLS 
standard errors, which in turn may increase the risk of falsely rejecting the null hypothesis. 
However, for the analysis of abnormal SEO announcement returns, we include a gap between 
the estimation window and the event window, thus the clustering is less likely to be interfering 
with the results (Campbell et al., 1997). Furthermore, to avoid the problem of overlapping 
events over time when analysing long-run post-issue performance, we exclude subsequent 
offerings that occur within an issuer’s post-event window for the preceding offering. 
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7. Empirical results: Short-term effects 
In this section, we present the empirical results from our analysis of short-term stock price 
dynamics around seasoned equity offerings. Specifically, we present and discuss the results 
from univariate tests on SEO announcement returns and offer price discounts. Additionally, 
we discuss the results from the cross-sectional regression analysis on abnormal announcement 
returns when controlling for other ex ante deal-and issuer-specific characteristics. 
7.1 Intended use of proceeds and abnormal 
announcement returns 
7.1.1 Descriptive sample statistics 
In Table 2, we present descriptive sample statistics for 463 issuers of seasoned equity on the 
Oslo Stock Exchange in the period 2000-2018, divided into each category of the intended use 
of proceeds. In Panel A, we present data on deal-and general issuer-specific characteristics, 
while we in Panel B present data about the issuers’ financial structure. 
The median sample firm has a market value of NOK ~1.0bn and offers 18% of the pre-issue 
shares outstanding. The distribution of market value is highly skewed to the right, indicating 
that our sample is more exposed towards smaller firms. We also note that issuers stating 
Refinancing motives appear to raise more equity relative to its market value. Furthermore, the 
average sample SEO firm offers a price discount of 15%, where the discount seems to be 
substantially larger for Refinancing issuers, reflecting large indirect costs of placing distressed 
shares. Consistent with the previous literature of strong pre-issue stock price runups (see 
Loughran and Ritter, 2000; Silva and Bilinski, 2015), the sample firms experience on average 
an abnormal return of 9% over the 2 months prior to the SEO announcement. However, we 
note that the runup is substantially larger for issuers stating Capex motives, while there seems 
to be little or no runup for Refinancing firms. Moreover, the distribution of the book-to-market 
ratios (BM) is highly right-skewed, particularly for issuers stating General or Refinancing 
motives. The median BM ratio is 0.55, while the mean is 2.29. A typical SEO firm also has a 
negative ROA of -2.2%, and accruals and working capital scaled by total assets of -0.05 and 
0.11, respectively. The median sample leverage is 0.57. We note that the financial position for 
issuers disclosing Capex, General or Refinancing motives seems to be substantially weaker 
relative to that of issuers raising equity for specific Investment purposes. In particular, 
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Refinancing firms appear to suffer from both high leverage and low liquidity, reflecting that 
many of these issuances can be classified as distressed equity offerings. 
Table 2 – Descriptive sample statistics 
 Investment Capex General Refinancing All issuers 
 N=72 N=97 N=222 N=72 N=463 
Variables Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Panel A: Deal-and general issuer characteristics 
Market Value (NOKm) 8,285 2,032 4,410 1,359 2,356 761 1,593 459 3,590 1,016 
Relative Deal Value 0.69 0.18 0.24 0.10 0.47 0.16 1.32 0.51 0.59 0.18 
Recent Issue (days) 578 280 514 331 687 459 914 604 665 413 
BM* 0.88 0.40 0.76 0.38 2.59 0.59 5.15 1.99 2.29 0.55 
Volatility 0.10 0.06 0.18 0.05 0.17 0.08 0.59 0.18 0.23 0.08 
Turnover (NOKm)* 971 164 416 143 291 62 263 53 426 72 
Runup 0.09 0.04 0.20 0.08 0.08 0.03 0.02 -0.06 0.09 0.03 
Offer Discount 0.06 0.02 0.09 0.05 0.16 0.08 0.31 0.22 0.15 0.06 
Panel B: Financial structure data        
Leverage* 0.53 0.57 0.45 0.49 0.53 0.57 0.76 0.68 0.56 0.57 
ROA* -0.06 0.01 -0.16 -0.03 -0.16 -0.02 -0.24 -0.08 -0.16 -0.02 
Accruals* -0.07 -0.02 -0.08 -0.05 -0.06 -0.04 -0.23 -0.01 -0.09 -0.05 
WC/TA* 0.13 0.15 0.22 0.18 0.17 0.11 -0.09 0.00 0.14 0.11 
*Missing data on some issuers within each category of intended use of proceeds. 
Note: The table presents descriptive statistics for 463 sample SEO issuers over the period 2000-2018 at Oslo Stock Exchange.  
Market Value is the observed market value on the day prior to SEO announcement. Relative Deal Value equals the number 
of shares offered relative to number of shares outstanding on the day prior to the announcement. Days Since Issue is number 
of days since previous SEO conducted by the same firm. BM is the book.to-market ratio, using market value one day prior to 
the announcement and book equity in the end of the fiscal year prior to the announcement. Leverage is total liabilities divided 
by total assets. ROA is net income scaled by total asset. Accruals is the difference between net income and operating cash 
flow scaled by total assets. WC/TA is working capital divided by total assets. All the accounting figures are measured at the 
end of the fiscal year prior to the SEO announcement. Runup is the aggregated abnormal return over a period of 42 trading 
days prior to the announcement date. Volatility is stock volatility measured over 63 trading days prior to the announcement. 
Stock Turnover is average monthly stock turnover over the last six months prior to the announcement date. Offer Discount is 
computed by dividing the pre-issue share price (one day prior to the SEO announcement) on the offer price minus one.  
 
7.1.2 Market reaction to SEO announcements 
Our conjecture is that firms stating potential valuable investment projects as the main motive 
for the equity issue, receive more favourable market reactions when publicly announced. This 
reasoning implies that these issuers are more credibly signalling potential accretive 
investments compared to more ambiguous issuers, which might either have less valuable 
projects or are intending to engage in agency spending or a wealth transfer from new to 
existing shareholders. Additionally, while we view refinancing as a specific issue motive, a 
substantial proportion of these issuers are firms in financial distress, typically offering shares 
at large discount to ensure that sufficient funds are raised. As a consequence, the market 
reaction is expected to suffer accordingly. 
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In Figure 5, we present average cumulative abnormal returns (CAARs)14 for each class of ex 
ante stated use of proceeds from day -4 to day +10 relative to the announcement date. Note 
that these returns are not adjusted for the potentially disclosed offer price discount. Most 
issuers seem to experience negative abnormal returns around the SEO announcement date, 
consistent with the existing literature of asymmetric information and agency issues (see Myers 
and Majluf, 1984; Loughran and Ritter 2000;Walker and Yost, 2008; Silva and Bilisnki, 2015). 
Moreover, we find a clear distinction between the different classifications of ex ante stated use 
of proceeds, where issuers stating specific Investment motives exhibit positive abnormal 
returns on average. Issuers stating that issue proceeds will be used for Capex experience more 
favourable price reactions relative to both General and Refinancing, whereof Refinancing 
firms on average exhibit the largest decline in stock prices around the announcement date. We 
also note that most of the abnormal stock price reaction occurs at the announcement day, 
consistent with the hypothesis of semi-strong market efficiency. 
Figure 5 – CAAR around SEO announcement 
 
Note: The chart shows the average cumulative abnormal return per classification of intended use of proceeds starting 4 days 
prior to the announcement date and ending 10 days post announcement date. The abnormal returns are estimated using the 
one-factor market model, where we estimate betas over a period of 251 trading days prior to the announcement. Stock prices 
are collected from Datastream using adjusted prices (adjusted for dividends, splits and other corporate events). 
 
14 We estimate CAAR as the sum of the average abnormal returns for all SEO firms (ARit) over each of the days around the 
announcement 
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In Table 3, we present mean and median CARs with corresponding t-and z-statistics using 
three different event windows. Over a five-day event window surrounding the announcement 
date (-2, 2), the mean sample CAR is -4.0% and significantly different from zero, generally 
consistent with previous findings on SEO announcement returns15. This suggests that the 
announcements convey essential new information about firm prospects. However, an 
important impact on the observed announcement effect is that many of these equity offerings 
suffer from large offer price discounts. As presented in Section 5.3, the majority of our sample 
equity offerings are conducted through an accelerated offer (private placement), where new 
shares are primarily directed towards certain new and/or existing investors, often offered a 
substantial discount to the pre-announcement market price. Due to the accelerated 
underwriting process, the offer price is typically disclosed in the initial announcement or 
shortly after, hence the discount is likely to explain much of the negative announcement effect. 
We discuss offer price discounts in more detail in the next subsection. 
Moreover, the results from Table 3 also suggest that information asymmetry, agency costs 
and/or offer price discounts differ significantly between the subgroups of intended use of 
proceeds. Using a five-day event-window, the mean abnormal announcement return for issuers 
stating specific Investment motives is 2.9%. However, the estimate is not statistically 
significant at conventional confidence levels, hence we do not find evidence of any abnormal 
performance for these issuers in the days surrounding the announcement date. In contrast, we 
find evidence that issuers revealing more vague investment motives (Capex) on average 
experience negative abnormal announcement returns. The mean CAR is -1.7% and 
significantly different from zero at 10% level. Moreover, the results indicate that the 
magnitude of the negative abnormal performance is larger for firms stating General or 
Refinancing purposes. The mean CAR for General firms is -4.7%, while Refinancing firms on 
average experience abnormal announcement returns of -11.5%. For both subgroups of 
intended use of proceeds, the estimated means are statistically significant at 1% level. We 
further note that the evidence from the median abnormal returns does not influence the 
inference, and the statistical evidence is even stronger. We also note that the results are 
generally robust to the choice event window. 
 
15 See Denis (1994), Jung et al. (1996), Walker and Yost (2008), and Silva and Bilinski (2015) 
 53 
Table 3 – CARs around SEO announcement split by the intended use of 
proceeds 
     
Intended Use of Proceeds  N CAR(-3, 3) CAR(-2, 2) CAR(-1, 1) 
Investment     
  Mean  72 0.0420 0.0290 0.0350 
  Median   -0.0030 -0.0060 0.0100 
  t-stat   (1.6050) (1.2780) (1.5130) 
  Sign test z-stat   [0.6060] [-0.0220] [0.9090] 
Capex     
  Mean  97 -0.0190 -0.0170 -0.0090 
  Median   -0.0280 -0.0300 -0.0180 
  t-stat   (-1.7250)* (-1.7010)* (-0.8680) 
  Sign test z-stat   [-2.8550]*** [-2.4270]** [-2.0740]** 
General     
  Mean  222 -0.0460 -0.0470 -0.0460 
  Median   -0.0380 -0.0330 -0.0290 
  t-statistic   (-3.9580)*** (-4.2570)*** (-4.8620)*** 
  Sign test z-stat   [-5.8200]*** [-5.8130]*** [-6.0510]*** 
Refinancing     
  Mean  72 -0.1110 -0.1150 -0.0940 
  Median   -0.0610 -0.0570 -0.0460 
  t-stat   (-3.5630)*** (-3.9910)*** (-3.2300)*** 
  Sign test z-stat   [-3.8550]*** [-3.5070]*** [-3.1930]*** 
All issuers     
  Mean  463 -0.0370 -0.0400 -0.0330 
  Median   -0.0330 -0.0280 -0.0220 
  t-stat   (-4.1190)*** (-4.7810)*** (-4.2140)*** 
  Sign test z-stat   [-6.8020]*** [-6.6890]*** [-6.2470]*** 
Note: The table presents the stock price reaction to SEO announcements split by intended use of proceeds measured by 
cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) over the event window. We report both mean and median returns using three different 
event windows. In curve brackets, we report two-sided t-statistics, while we in square brackets report Wilcoxon sign test z-
statistics. N is the number of observations per use of proceeds classification. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 
the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
To provide further evidence of differences in announcement returns between the sub-
categories of the intended use of proceeds, we present test statistics from the two-sample 
Wilcoxon rank-sum test and the two-sample Welch-adjusted t-test in Table 4. The Wilcoxon 
rank-sum test is a nonparametric test used to examine whether the medians of two samples 
differ significantly, while the Welch-adjusted t-test is used to test for differences in means 
between two samples with unequal variances. In line with Silva and Bilinski (2015), we use 
an event window of four days surrounding the SEO announcement (-2, 2), which also seems 
to capture most of the abnormal price movement around the announcement date (see Figure 
5). The test-statistics in Table 4 are consistent with the results presented in Table 3. The 
Investment category differs significantly from all other subgroups of the intended use of 
proceeds at 10% level in both tests. Furthermore, we find evidence that issuers citing Capex 
motives exhibit more favourable market reactions around the announcement date relative to 
General and Refinancing firms, considering both mean and median abnormal returns. 
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However, for General versus Refinancing firms, only the two-sample t-test provides evidence 
of differences in the abnormal announcement returns, significant at 5% level. The positive 
test-statistic implies that the mean abnormal return for issuers stating General purposes is less 
negative relative to that of firms stating Refinancing reasons. Nevertheless, at conventional 
confidence levels, we do not find evidence that the median abnormal market reaction for these 
sub-categories differs significantly. 
Table 4 – Two-sample t-test and Wilcoxon rank-sum test on CARs 
Use of Proceeds  Two-Sample Wilcoxon 
Rank-Sum Test 
Two-Sample Welch’s t-test for 
Unequal Variances 
Investment vs. Capex   
  Test-statistics  1.8920* 1.8790* 
  P-value  (0.0590) (0.0620) 
Investment vs. General   
  Test-statistics  3.4060*** 3.2360*** 
  P-value  (0.0010) (0.0010) 
Investment vs. Refinancing   
  Test-statistics  2.9050*** 3.8480*** 
  P-value  (0.0040) (0.0000) 
Capex vs. General   
  Test-statistics  1.7260* 1.8130** 
  P-value  (0.0840) (0.0487) 
Capex vs. Refinancing   
  Test-statistics  2.0280** 3.5620*** 
  P-value  (0.0430) (0.0000) 
General vs. Refinancing   
  Test-statistics  1.1040 2.5640** 
  P-value  (0.2300)                        (0.0110) 
Note: The table presents two different tests to test whether the CARs differ significantly when grouped by intended use of 
proceeds using an event window of 5 days (-2,2). The left column presents the z-statistics from non-parametric two-sample 
Wilcoxon rank-sum tests, while the right column presents Welch-adjusted t-statistics from two-sample t-tests. P-values are 
reported in parenthesis. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
7.1.3 Offer price discount in accelerated offers 
As previously mentioned, an important effect on the observed negative announcement returns 
is the offer price discounts, reflecting the indirect cost of issuing equity. In Table 5, we present 
the mean and median offer price discounts for the different use of proceeds classifications as 
well as two-sample test-statistics to test for differences in means and medians between the 
sub-categories. However, in contrast to what we presented in the table of descriptive statistics, 
we here only include accelerated offers, or more commonly referred to as private placements. 
We focus on this flotation method as the offer price is typically disclosed in the initial 
announcement or shortly after. The results from Panel A illustrate, as we would expect, that 
 55 
larger offer price discounts are associated with less favourable market reactions. Regardless 
of the stated intended use of proceeds, the mean offer price discount is 9.25% and significantly 
different from zero. For issuers stating specific Investment reasons, the mean offer price 
discount is 2.71%, statistically significant at conventional confidence levels. For Capex and 
General firms, the offer price is on average 7.46% and 9.08% below the pre-announcement 
market price, respectively, both significant at 1% level. For issuers intending to use the issue 
proceeds for Refinancing purposes, the offer price discount is substantially larger relative to 
the other sub-categories, with a mean of 23.41%, significantly different from zero at 1% level. 
We further note that the median discounts are consistently smaller in magnitude, suggesting 
that some issuers suffer from substantially larger discounts relative to the typical issuer. 
However, the inference does not change when considering the medians. The results from Panel 
B are also generally consistent with the sign and magnitude of the means and medians in Panel 
A, whereof Capex and General are the only sub-categories that differ insignificantly from each 
other. 
Table 5 – Mean and median offer price discounts in accelerated offers 
    
Offer price discount – Accelerated Offers N Mean Median 
Panel A: Offer price discount   
Investment    
  Mean/Median  58 2.71% 1.53% 
  Test-statistic   ( 2.054)** [ 3.482]*** 
Capex    
  Mean/Median  86 7.46% 4.25% 
  Test-statistic   (7.250)*** [7.671]*** 
General    
  Mean/Median  157 9.08% 5.00% 
  Test-statistic   (8.607)*** [10.012]*** 
Refinancing    
  Mean/Median  45 23.41% 13.74% 
  Test-statistic   (5.128)*** [4.557]*** 
All issuers    
  Mean/Median  346 9.25% 4.48% 
  Test-statistic   (10.975)*** [13.757]*** 
Panel B: Two sample Welch adjusted t-test and Wilcoxon rank-sum test    
Investment vs. Capex  t = -2.8385*** z = -3.436*** 
Investment vs. General  t = -3.7678*** z = -4.086*** 
Investment vs. Refinancing  t = -4.3554*** z = -4.288*** 
Capex vs. General  t = -1.0957 z = -0.847 
Capex vs. Refinancing  t = -3.4074*** z = -3.090*** 
General vs. Refinancing  t = -3.0586*** z = -3.019*** 
Note: In Panel A, we present mean and median offer price discounts in the sample of accelerated offers split by the intended 
use of proceeds. In curve brackets, we report two-sided t-statistics, while we in square brackets report Wilcoxon sign test z-
statistics. In Panel B, we report statistics from two-sample Welch-adjusted t-tests and two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum tests. 
*, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
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As the results in Table 5 suggest, accelerated offers may be considered controversial in the 
sense that only certain new and/or existing investors are targeted and offered shares at a 
substantial discount to the market price. Assuming no subsequent repair offering, this leads to 
a wealth transfer from existing shareholders to certain selected new and/or existing 
shareholders. If the issuer however chooses to conduct a subsequent repair offering,  the non-
targeted existing shareholders are likely to still suffer from value dilution, as these offerings 
tend to be relatively small. Mola and Loughran (2004) offer an underwriter power explanation 
of the observed large offer price discounts, of which increasingly influences from the 
investment banks lead to higher offer price discounts as more money is left on the table for 
their clients rather than the issuing firm. They find that both influence from the underwriters 
and offer price discounts have increased over time, consistent with their argument. Another 
explanation for the issuance of largely discounted shares in accelerated offers may be that the 
issuer directly compensates the investor for the rapid execution process, hence avoiding costs 
of due diligence and quality inspection (Eckbo, 2007). Moreover, the issuer may seek to attract 
certain investors to benefit from increased monitoring services and expert advice in the long-
run. Additionally, the discount may be used as compensation to “friendly” investors for 
allowing management to maintain private benefits of control. We also suggest a related 
explanation, of which targeted investors may demand a discount to further increase its already 
“optimal” exposure towards the firm. This is consistent with the findings of Wang and Hu 
(2014), who find that the proportion of new shares subscribed by larger existing shareholders 
in private placements is positively associated with the price discount. The expected benefits 
of targeting the specific investors should thus overcome the costs of issuing discounted equity. 
Overall, we find evidence in line with our expectations that issuers revealing specific 
Investment plans on average do not experience any abnormal price reaction to the 
announcement of the equity offering. We also find that these issuers on average bear an 
indirect cost through the issuance of discounted equity, but considerably lower than for the 
other sub-categories. This suggests that the market considers the issue proceeds to be used to 
fund positive NPV projects that at least offset the observed offer price discounts. For more 
ambiguous issuers, Capex and General, we find evidence of relatively large discounts, 
whereof the market reaction upon announcement suffers accordingly. Particularly firms 
disclosing Refinancing motives are hurt extensively. A large proportion of these issuers are in 
financial distress, hence to ensure a successful placement of new shares, the offer price is often 
set well below the pre-announcement market price. 
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7.1.4 Multivariate regression analysis 
Below, we present the results from the cross-sectional regression analysis on abnormal 
announcement returns, determining whether the differences in announcement returns between 
the subgroups of the intended use of proceeds persist when controlling for the disclosed offer 
price discount in accelerated offers as well as other ex ante factors. However, it should be 
noted that the explanatory power of these regression types is uniformly low. According to 
Eckbo (2007), this is almost always less than 10%, as reported in the literature. 
In Table 6, we present the coefficient estimates from Equation (8) with corresponding t-
statistics. The dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal announcement return for each 
SEO firm in the cross-section, measured over four days surrounding the event window. 
Following Silva and Bilinski (2015), the estimated t-statistics are based on standard errors 
adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clustering across firms and years as the residuals may be 
correlated across firm and over time16. All models include year and industry fixed effects. In 
Model (1), we only include binary indicators for the stated intended use of proceeds 
classifications, where Investment is the omitted variable. In Model (2), we also control for 
binary variables for the choice of flotation method, using rights offers as the reference group. 
In Model (3) and (4), we add other deal-specific characteristics, controlling for offer price 
discount and relative deal size. Moreover, in Model (5), we add various variables for issuer-
/stock-specific characteristics such as market value, book-to-market ratio, pre-issue stock run-
up, stock turnover and volatility. Finally, in Model (6), we include issuer-specific financial 
characteristics, controlling for the pre-issue operating performance, earnings quality, leverage 
and liquidity. The rationale for the inclusion of the various control variables is explained in 
Section 6.1.2. For robustness, in unreported results, we estimate CARs based on the Fama-
French three-factor model (FF3M). Consistent with the argument by Kothari and Warner 
(2008), that short-term event studies are largely immune to misspecifications in estimating 
expected returns, this does not substantively influence our results. Additionally, in Appendix 
E, we rerun the regression models using a two-day event window surrounding the 
announcement date, nor does this change our results significantly17. 
 
16 Petersen (2009) argues that, in presence of time-series dependence and cross-sectional dependence, clustering across year 
and firm yields unbiased test-statistics given that there are sufficient number of clusters for both dimensions.  
17 The magnitude of the negative coefficients on Refinancing are somewhat smaller, but does not change the inference.  
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Table 6 – Cross-sectional regression analysis on abnormal announcement 
returns 
Dependent variable: CAR(-2,2) Model 
(1) 
Model 
(2) 
Model 
(3) 
Model 
(4) 
Model 
(5) 
Model 
(6) 
Capex -0.026 -0.038 -0.035 -0.017 -0.009 -0.009 
 (-1.03) (-1.47) (-1.46) (-1.00) (-0.47) (-0.46) 
General -0.060** -0.058** -0.049** -0.032* -0.023 -0.018 
 (-2.34) (-2.28) (-2.17) (-1.77) (-1.24) (-0.88) 
Refinancing -0.125*** -0.110*** -0.076** -0.075** -0.026 -0.023 
 (-3.39) (-3.20) (-2.56) (-2.52) (-0.94) (-0.79) 
Fully Marketed  -0.104** -0.105* -0.111** -0.049 -0.037 
  (-1.99) (-1.93) (-2.20) (-0.97) (-0.62) 
Accelerated  0.074*** 0.105*** 0.064*** 0.065** 0.067** 
  (3.51) (4.25) (2.93) (2.37) (2.12) 
Accelerated*Offer Discount   -0.259*** -0.297*** -0.257** -0.267** 
   (-2.61) (-3.61) (-2.22) (-2.23) 
Relative Deal Size    -0.033*** -0.024* -0.023* 
    (-2.90) (-1.69) (-1.71) 
Accelerated*Relative Deal Size    0.060*** 0.053*** 0.052*** 
    (4.67) (3.64) (3.70) 
Ln(Market Value)     0.019* 0.024** 
     (1.81) (2.02) 
Ln(BM)     -0.010 -0.013 
     (-0.95) (-1.07) 
Runup     0.002 -0.006 
     (0.06) (-0.17) 
Volatility     -0.007 -0.005 
     (-0.20) (-0.14) 
Ln(Stock Turnover)     -0.015** -0.018** 
     (-1.98) (-2.19) 
Recent Issue     0.046** 0.042** 
     (2.57) (2.17) 
ROA      -0.025 
      (-0.75) 
Accruals      -0.036 
      (-0.66) 
Leverage      -0.071* 
      (-1.68) 
WC/TA      -0.055* 
      (-1.66) 
Constant -0.006 -0.029 -0.039 -0.028 0.042 0.168* 
 (-0.12) (-0.58) (-0.83) (-0.62) (0.44) (1.75) 
Year FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.057 0.113 0.150 0.244 0.243 0.251 
N 463 463 463 463 404 376 
Note: The table presents the results from the cross-sectional analysis on SEO announcement returns using OLS regressions. 
The dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal return measured over a five-day event window around the SEO 
announcement date i.e. CAR (-2, 2). The explanatory variables are defined in Section 6.1.3. T-statistics are reported in 
parenthesis and are based on standard errors adjusted for heteroscedasticity and firm clustering. All models include year and 
industry fixed-effects. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
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In Model (1) – (4), the results uniformly provide evidence that issuers stating General and 
Refinancing purposes experience less favourable market reactions relative to issuers stating 
specific Investment motives, supporting our hypothesis that the market reacts differently to 
various disclosed information on the intended use of proceeds.  However, in contrast to the 
results from the univariate tests in the previous subsection, none of the estimated coefficients 
on Capex are statistically significant at conventional confidence levels, hence we cannot 
conclude that the market favours issuers stating specific investment motives relative to those 
that are more ambiguous about its investment plans. The sign and magnitude of the estimated 
coefficients on Capex do not vary substantially between the model specifications, suggesting 
that much of the negative market reaction to the SEO announcement for these issuers may be 
attributed to year and industry fixed effects.  
Further, in Model (3) and (4), when including various offer-specific characteristics, we note 
that the magnitude of the negative coefficients on Refinancing and General is substantially 
smaller. We particularly emphasise the importance of the offer price discount as most of the 
sample offerings are accelerated offers, hence the offer price is typically disclosed within the 
event window. As shown in Table 5, both General and Refinancing firms suffer on average 
from large offer price discounts, hence the results from Model (3) and (4) suggest that much 
of the negative market reaction upon the announcement can be explained by larger discounts 
rather than firms capitalising on overvalued equity.  
Moreover, from Model (5) and (6), where we control for various issuer-specific characteristics, 
the estimated coefficients on the binary variables for General and Refinancing are no longer 
statistically significant at traditional confidence levels. Nor do we find any evidence of 
differences between the estimated coefficients, suggesting that the market on average does not 
discriminate between the revealed information on the intended use of proceeds. We further 
note that the magnitude of the negative coefficients on Capex, General and Refinancing in 
Model (5) and (6) is consistently smaller than in Model (1) – (4).  
Most noteworthy is the results from Model (5), indicating that issuer-/stock-specific 
characteristics explain much of the negative price reaction after controlling for deal-specific 
characteristics. The observed reduction in the magnitude of the coefficients on the use of 
proceeds variables is particularly present for issuers disclosing Refinancing reasons. We note 
that factors such as market value, stock turnover and recent issue have a significant effect on 
the abnormal announcement returns. The most interesting feature is however when we rerun 
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Model (5) and exclude market value and book-to-market ratio (unreported). The coefficients 
on both General and Refinancing are statistically significant at 5% level. As shown in the 
descriptive statistics, these firms tend to be both smaller and have higher book-to-market ratios 
than the other subgroups. Although we only provide evidence that announcement returns are 
negatively associated with firm size at conventional confidence levels, the combination of high 
book-to-market ratio and low market value seems to capture a large proportion of the negative 
effect from disclosing that issue proceeds are intended to be raised for General and 
Refinancing purposes. Fama and French (1992) simply argue that high book-to-market stocks 
carry higher risk due to the usual financial distress of these firms. The market value thus suffers 
accordingly. As previously described, many of the sample firms within the Refinancing 
category are in financial distress upon the announcement. Thus, some of the observed negative 
price reaction, not explained by the offer price discount, may be attributed to factors capturing 
greater uncertainty around future earnings as a consequence of distressed conditions.  
Flotation method 
Further, our results suggest that the market reacts more favourably to certain flotation methods. 
Due to a small number of public offerings in our sample, we focus on accelerated offers and 
rights issues. In Model (2), the coefficient on the binary variable Accelerated is significantly 
positive, indicating that the announcement effect in an accelerated offer is less negative 
relative to rights offers. A possible explanation is that the flotation method provides 
opportunities and incentives for communication between the management and the targeted 
investors, thus alleviate some concerns around the possibility that the offering is overpriced 
(Eckbo, 2007). 
However, as previously discussed, an important implication is that targeted investors often are 
offered shares at a substantial discount to the current market price. In Model (3) – (6), we have 
controlled for this effect by including an interaction term between the offer price discount and 
the indicator for accelerated offer. The coefficient on Accelerated is still significantly positive 
in all model specifications, hence in the presence of no offer price discount, the indirect 
announcement costs for accelerated offers are considerably lower relative to rights offerings. 
However, as the coefficient on the interaction term is significantly negative, the relative benefit 
of this flotation method decreases by the size of the discount. Considering the large observed 
offer price discounts in many of these transactions, the market discrimination between rights 
and accelerated offerings is not as pronounced as indicated in Model (2).  
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Relative issue size 
In Model (4) – (6), we add a variable for the relative size of the offering as well as an 
interaction term between relative deal size and the binary indicator for accelerated offer. The 
estimated coefficient on Relative Deal Size is significantly negative in all the model 
specifications, indicating that abnormal announcement returns are negatively associated with 
the relative size of the offerings when shares are issued through rights. This is consistent with 
the resolution of the rights offer paradox by Eckbo and Masulis (1992), in which lower 
expected shareholder takeup increases the adverse selection risk. Although the relative deal 
size is not a direct measure of the expected shareholder takeup, it might still proxy the expected 
subscription rate in rights issues due to shareholders’ wealth and portfolio constraints. 
Conversely, for accelerated offers, the estimated coefficient on the interaction term is 
significantly positive, indicating that investors react more favourably when large equity 
proceeds are raised through an accelerated offer. Although this is contrary to the rationale of 
adverse selection, we suggest that issuers with the intention of raising a significant proportion 
of its current market value through an accelerated process may signal better growth prospects.  
Issuer-and stock-specific characteristics 
We find evidence that some of the issuer-/stock-specific characteristics in Model (5) and (6) 
significantly impact the market reaction to the announcement of a seasoned equity offering. 
First, in line with the reasoning that there exists less asymmetric information between the 
market and managers of larger firms, our results indicate that abnormal announcement returns 
are positively related to firm size. Second, the results suggest that firms with higher stock 
turnover tend to experience more negative price reactions upon the announcement of the 
offering. This is contrary to the argument of Dierkens (1991), that firms with higher stock 
turnover have lower degree of information asymmetry. However, we suggest an explanation 
in line with observed strong stock price runups for issuers intending to raise equity. Although 
we do not attribute this to a pure timing-motive, we argue that managers are not likely to be 
passive price takers, hence they may engage in a variety of practices after internally deciding 
to raise equity to increase the likelihood of a successful stock placement. This is expected to 
increase both the stock price and share turnover in the pre-announcement period, hence upon 
the announcement, the market may become aware of the strategic actions taken. 
Issuer-specific financial characteristics 
Considering the explanatory variables for issuer-specific financial characteristics in Model (6), 
we find evidence that announcement returns are associated with the relative amount of 
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working capital. The coefficient on WC/TA is significantly negative, consistent with the 
argument of Myers and Majluf (1984), that issuers with high liquidity when raising equity 
capital may subsequently invest in a value-decreasing manner. 
Moreover, we find that more levered firms exhibit poorer announcement returns, with the 
negative coefficient on Leverage significantly different from zero. This is inconsistent with 
the free cash flow theory, in which more levered firms do not have the financial slack to take 
on value-decreasing projects. However, given that the issuer is highly levered, we suggest that 
the equity announcement may be an indirect (or direct) confirmation that the issuer is in 
financial distress or need to de-lever to adapt to less favourable firm prospects, whereof raising 
external equity is the only viable alternative. Given that there exists some degree of 
asymmetric information between the managers and the market, the negative “new” 
information will then immediately be reflected upon announcement. 
Summing up the regression results 
Overall, the results from the cross-sectional regression analysis indicate that the market 
discrimination of the ex ante stated use of proceeds does not persist when controlling for other 
deal-and issuer-specific characteristics. The findings are partly inconsistent with those of 
Walker and Yost (2008) and Silva and Bilinski (2015), who find evidence of superior 
announcement returns for issuers stating specific investment motives. However, none of these 
studies control for the apparently large offer price discounts, hence they may be falsely 
concluding given that the purpose of the capital raise does not fully explain the differences in 
issue discounts. Our results indicate that much of the negative price reactions can be attributed 
to the large offer price discounts. Though, it is plausible to believe that the intended use of 
proceeds has a direct impact on the offer price and thus indirectly affect the market reaction. 
We further find that there exists some degree of asymmetric information in which issuers that 
appear to be in financial distress experience poor announcement returns that are not fully 
explained by the offer price discounts. We suggest that the market may raise additional 
concerns around issuers’ future earnings when the intention of issuing equity is publicly 
announced. We also provide partly evidence that issuers’ stocks may be considered overvalued 
at the time of the SEO announcement. Although we do not attribute this to a pure-timing 
motive, we argue that managers have incentives to take strategic actions to increase the 
likelihood of a successful placement after internally deciding to raise capital through the equity 
market, hence increasing both stock liquidity and prices. 
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8. Empirical results: Long-term effects 
In this section, we examine long-term stock price dynamics following seasoned equity 
offerings. Specifically, we present and discuss the results from the analysis of prospectus 
disclosure and long-run post-issue stock returns. Moreover, to better understand the link 
between the disclosed information on the intended use of proceeds and post-issue market 
performance, we also examine ex post firm characteristics and change in operating 
performance using both univariate and multivariate tests. 
8.1 Intended use of proceeds and long-run post-issue 
stock performance 
In the following, we present the results of our analysis of long-run post-issue market 
performance using both the matched-firm technique and time-series regressions. As described 
in Section 6, we only include firms that have issued equity over the period 2002-2015 on the 
Oslo Stock Exchange. Furthermore, to avoid overlapping events, we only consider the first 
equity issue in an overlapping period, thus our dataset includes 278 issuers of seasoned equity 
from the initial sample. Specifically, we expect that issuers stating specific investment motives 
do not exhibit abnormal returns in the subsequent period. In contrast, we expect more 
ambiguous issuers to suffer from poor post-issue performance as we consider these issuers to 
be more likely to be opportunistic market-timers or engage in agency spending. 
8.1.1 Matched-firm technique 
Below, we present the results from the long-run post-issue stock performance according to the 
matched-firm technique described in Section 6.1, where all the sample SEO firms are matched 
by non-issuing firms on industry, size and book-to-market ratio. Figure 6 shows the 36-month 
development in mean buy-and-hold abnormal returns per category of intended use of proceeds. 
We note that the mean buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR) for the sample in total is 
consistently negative, hence the SEO firms on average underperform its matched non-issuing 
firms over a period of 36 months subsequent to the offering. Further, we note that firms 
disclosing specific Investment motives on average differ distinctively from the other sub-
categories of the intended use of proceeds. These issuers experience on average slightly 
positive buy-and-hold abnormal returns, while the rest of the sample underperform its matched 
non-issuing firms over the entire period, with the most severe underperformance for issuers 
 64
disclosing Refinancing needs. We also note that the long-run post-issue performance for the 
different use of proceeds categories generally is consistent with the sign and relative 
magnitude of the offer price discounts and announcement returns from the previous 
subsection, suggesting that the market underreacts upon the announcement of the offerings. 
Figure 6 – 36-month development in ex post mean buy-and-hold abnormal 
returns 
 
 
Note: The figure presents the 36-month development in mean BHARs split by intended use of proceeds. The sample includes 
278 SEOs conducted on the Oslo Stock Exchange during the period 2002-2015.  
In Table 7, we present mean and median buy-and-hold abnormal returns for the SEO firms 
split by the intended use of proceeds with corresponding test-statistics. We present the results 
using three different post-event windows, 12-, 24- and 36-months. The table only entails the 
results of the equally-weighted scheme as the value-weighted scheme is highly dependent on 
a limited number of SEO firms due to the right-skewed distribution of firm size in our sample. 
From Panel A, we show that the average abnormal return for the sample is negative and 
statistically significant, independent of the post-event window. Over a post-issue period of 36 
months, we estimate a mean BHAR of -16.5%. However, the magnitude of the abnormal 
negative return is larger when using a 24-month horizon, with a mean BHAR of -20.8%. These 
findings are generally consistent with previous studies on other markets when applying the 
same methodology, supporting the widely documented SEO underperformance (see Loughran 
and Ritter, 1995; Spiess and Affleck-Graves, 1995; Jegadeesh, 2000; Jeanneret, 2005). 
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Table 7 - Post-issue BHARs split by intended use of proceeds 
     
 Intended Use of Proceeds  N BHAR 12m BHAR 24m BHAR 36m 
Panel A: BHAR (%) matched on size and book-to-market 
Investment     
  Mean  36 0.1070 0.1710 0.1840 
  Median   0.0310 0.1590 0.1130 
  t-stat   (1.0030) (1.3360) (1.3810) 
  Sign test z-stat   [1.0470] [1.2000] [1.2000] 
Capex     
  Mean  59 -0.1200 -0.2700 -0.3250 
  Median   -0.1800 -0.2490 -0.2500 
  t-stat   (-1.4210) (-2.1880)** (-2.8330)*** 
  Sign test z-stat   [-1.8280]* [-2.5080]** [-3.0800]*** 
General     
  Mean  137 -0.1810 -0.2410 -0.1480 
  Median   -0.1670 -0.2450 -0.2940 
  t-stat   (-3.0990)*** (-3.2630)*** (-1.8490)* 
  Sign test z-stat   [-3.5380]*** [-3.5740]*** [-2.0960]** 
Refinancing     
  Mean  46 -0.2030 -0.4050 -0.3660 
  Median   -0.2560 -0.3770 -0.3990 
  t-stat   (-1.9590)* (-3.5990)*** (-3.0260)*** 
  Sign test z-stat   [-2.7640]*** [-3.7260]*** [-3.3300]*** 
All issuers     
  Mean  278 -0.1270 -0.2080 -0.1650 
  Median   -0.1440 -0.2180 -0.2320 
  t-stat   (-3.1250)*** (-4.0120)*** (-3.0530)*** 
  Sign test z-stat   [-4.0180]*** [-4.6410]*** [-3.7130]*** 
Panel B: Differences in mean BHARs matched on size and book-to-market 
Investment vs. Capex  t=1.701* t=2.578*** t=3.073*** 
Investment vs. General  t=2.545** t=3.032*** t=2.285** 
Investment vs. Refinancing  t=2.137** t=3.595*** t=3.238*** 
Capex vs. General  t=0.667 t=0.139 t=-0.984 
Capex vs. Refinancing  t=0.658 t=1.213 t=0.639 
General vs. Refinancing  t=0.212 t=1.211 t=1.498 
Note: Panel A presents mean and median BHARs for each category of intended use of proceeds measured over 12, 24 and 36 
months following the equity offerings.  In curve brackets, we report two-sided t-statistics, while we in square brackets report 
Wilcoxon sign test z-statistics. Panel B presents Welch-adjusted t-tests for differences in mean BHARs between the sub-
categories of intended use of proceeds. N is the number of SEOs per use of proceeds classification. *, ** and *** denote 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
Investment use of proceeds 
From Panel A, we do not find evidence that issuers stating specific Investment motives exhibit 
abnormal post-issue stock performance. The mean BHAR for this subgroup over the 36-month 
horizon is positive at 18.4%, but insignificantly different from zero. The magnitude of the 
estimated means is somewhat smaller when using shorter time horizons (10.7% for 12 months 
and 17.1% for 24 months), neither these are statistically significant at traditional confidence 
levels. This supports our hypothesis that issuers choosing to reveal specific information about 
its investment plans are more credibly signalling that the issue proceeds will be used for a 
 66
value-increasing manner. This is also generally consistent with the findings of Silva and 
Bilinski (2015) and Autore et al. (2009).  
Capex use of proceeds 
For issuers stating Capex motives, we find evidence of a significant underperformance over a 
period of 36 months following the equity offerings. Both the mean and median BHARs are 
significantly negative (mean BHAR of -32.5% and median BHAR of -25.0%). The same holds 
for the 24-month horizon with a mean BHAR of -27.0% (median BHAR of -24.9%). The 12-
month horizon shows the least cases of significance, where only the median BHAR is 
significantly negative at 10% level. The observed underperformance is in line with our 
expectations that issuers being more ambiguous about its investment plans are more likely to 
have a timing-motive or have managers that plan to engage in agency spending. Myers and 
Majluf (1984) suggest that managers have incentives to raise equity and invest in negative 
NPV projects if they consider the equity overvalued and expect the loss from the unprofitable 
investment to be offset by the gain from issuing overvalued equity. This is consistent with 
what we presented in the descriptive statistics in Section 7.1, where Capex firms on average 
experience strong price run-ups prior to the offering. Furthermore, these issuers generally hold 
more liquid assets relative to the other sub-categories, supporting the theory that issuers with 
financial slack may be more likely to take on value-decreasing investments. We will 
investigate this further in Section 8.2 when analysing ex post firm characteristics. 
General use of proceeds 
For issuers with the primary motivation of raising equity for General purposes, we find 
evidence of poor post-issue stock performance. These firms on average underperform its 
matched non-issuing firms by 14.8% over a 36-month horizon. For the median firm, the 
underperformance is even more severe with a BHAR of -29.4%. Both the mean and median 
are significantly different from zero. Moreover, the magnitude of the average 
underperformance is larger when using 12- and 24-month horizons, with mean BHARs of -
18.1% and -24.1%, respectively, both significant at 1% level. Our results are generally 
consistent with the findings of Autore et al. (2009). However, they contradict the findings of 
Jeanneret (2005) on rights offerings in France, who find that issuers stating pure capital 
structure purposes do not exhibit abnormal post-issue stock performance. He suggests that 
offerings with the purpose of preserving financial flexibility or strengthening the part of equity 
are subject to the capital irrelevance theory. However, as for the Capex firms, we argue that 
these issuers may be more likely to be opportunistic market timers, aiming to benefit existing 
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shareholders at the expense of new shareholders. Furthermore, corporate managers not 
revealing any or little information on the intended use of proceeds may seek to mask bad 
information about the firm prospects. We note that the median earnings accruals for issuers 
stating Capex or General are substantially higher than for the other subgroups (see descriptive 
statistics in Section 7.1), supporting both a timing motive and that managers seek to not fully 
disclose information on the true conditions of the company if they consider the market to be 
overly optimistic. 
Refinancing use of proceeds 
For the last sub-category of the intended use of proceeds, Refinancing, we find evidence of a 
significant underperformance over all the post-event windows. The 36-month mean BHAR is 
-36.6% and significant at 1% level. The magnitude of the 24-month abnormal negative return 
is somewhat larger, with a BHAR of -40.5%, while we estimate a 12-month mean BHAR of -
20.3%. The statistical evidence is even stronger when considering the medians. Our findings 
are in line with those of Silva and Bilinski (2015), who find that issuers in the UK stating 
recapitalisation motives underperform non-issuers matched on size and book-to-market by 
45.4% over a three-year post-issue period. The findings are also consistent with Autore et al. 
(2009) and Hertzel and Li (2010), who find that the underperformance is most severe for 
issuers stating recapitalisation purposes. They argue that these issuers are more likely to take 
advantage of periods of temporary overvaluation to benefit existing shareholders. 
Even though there is an apparent motive for issuing overvalued equity when the intention is 
to repay debt, we note that many of these sample issuers are firms in financial distress, hence 
we do not fully attribute the underperformance to a timing-motive. In Section 7.1, we showed 
that the average pre-issue stock run-up is only slightly positive, while the median is negative 
for these SEO firms, possibly reflecting distressed conditions prior to the announcement. We 
further note that this sub-category is highly skewed towards cyclical industries, such as Oil & 
Gas and Shipping (see Appendix C), often raising equity during prolonged market downturns. 
Consequently, the post-issue performance has, to a greater extent, a binary outcome in which 
a substantial share of the issuers is going bankrupt or undergo financial restructurings during 
the post-event window. We further argue that one explanation for the underperformance may 
be that the matched-firm technique fails to properly match non-issuing firms with similar 
systematic risk in a small, cyclical market such as the Norwegian equity market. For instance, 
firms that acquire assets may be matched with firms holding less capital-intensive business 
models, whereof firms owning assets are more likely to suffer from prolonged market 
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downturns and consequently are forced to raise equity to meet its debt commitments. Given 
that these equity offerings are conducted during downcycles, a holding period of 36 months 
may be too short to capture the full cycle, hence the apparently riskier equities are likely to 
suffer extensively. 
Summing up ex post stock performance 
Overall, the results from Table 7 are consistent with our hypothesis that issuers revealing 
specifics about its investment plans do not exhibit abnormal post-issue performance. For all 
other subgroups of the intended use of proceeds, we find evidence of negative abnormal ex 
post performance that is robust to the choice of post-event window. Furthermore, in Panel B, 
we do not find significant differences in the mean BHARs between the intended use of 
proceeds classifications. The results thus suggest that only Investment differs significantly 
from the other subgroups, further supporting the argument that these issuers are more credibly 
signalling that the proceeds will be used in a value-increasing manner. The findings are 
generally in line with theories on market-timing and agency issues. We look further into these 
explanations in Section 8.2. 
8.1.2 Time-series regressions 
As an alternative methodology to examine long-run post-issue stock performance, we estimate 
various time-series regression models. In Table 8, we present the results from the time-series 
regressions on post-issue stock returns using a 36-month horizon. As explained in the 
methodology section, we create portfolios of firms conducting seasoned equity offerings based 
on the stated intended use of proceeds. The firms enter the portfolios in the month subsequent 
to the offering and exit after 36 months or when delisted (if sooner). The sample size is the 
same as for the matched-firm technique. For robustness, we present the results using both the 
one-factor market model and the Fama-French three-factor model. Although a debated subject, 
the risk-factors beyond the market factor seem to be somewhat arbitrary for the Norwegian 
stock market, hence we leave the inference on the results from the three-factor model 
unreported. Our primary focus is the estimated alphas (regression intercepts), reflecting 
annualised monthly abnormal returns over the three-year post-issue period. Although the 
regression intercepts cannot be directly compared to the abnormal returns from the matched-
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firm technique in the previous section, we can estimate mean buy-and-hold returns from 
earning the intercept return every year over the corresponding holding period18. 
In Panel A, we report the estimated alphas for the sample SEO firms, while we in Panel B 
present estimated alphas for portfolios of matched non-issuing firms, similar to those we used 
when estimating BHARs with the matched-firm technique. Panel C contains the results from 
the zero-investment portfolios that are long issuing firms and short matched non-issuing firms. 
We present factor loadings for all the portfolios in Appendix F. 
Table 8 – Time-series regressions on 36-month long-run post-issue stock 
returns 
 
 Investment Capex General Refinancing All issuers 
 N=36 N=59 N=137 N=46 N=278 
Panel A: Regression intercepts – SEO firms 
CAPM alpha (%) 0.52 -9.07* -9.78** -21.54** -10.84*** 
 (0.10) (-1.66) (-2.07) (-2.58) (-2.72) 
FF3M alpha (%) -2.80 -12.65** -16.49*** -30.67*** -17.10*** 
 (-0.52) (-2.33) (-3.75) (-3.78) (-4.74) 
Panel B: Regression intercepts – Matched SEO firms 
CAPM alpha (%)  0.85 -3.17  0.22 -4.04 -0.94 
 (0.15) (-0.89) (0.06) (-0.46) (-0.28) 
FF3M alpha (%) -5.18 -7.78** -4.68 -11.80 -6.29** 
 (-0.92) (-2.30) (-1.40) (-1.36) (-2.08) 
Panel C: Regression intercepts – Zero-investment portfolios 
CAPM alpha (%) -3.53 -8.62 -12.72*** -20.22* -9.91*** 
 (-0.49) (-1.61) (-3.20) (-1.79) (-3.20) 
FF3M alpha (%) -0.97 -7.62 -14.56*** -21.61* -10.79*** 
 (-0.13) (-1.40) (-3.59) (-1.86) (-3.39) 
Note: Panels A and B report annualised monthly alpha estimates for the sample SEO firms and non-issuing matched firms 
using the calendar-time portfolio models in Equation (11) and (12). Panel C contains estimated alphas from the zero-
investment portfolios which are long in the event firms and short in the matched non-event firms. The intercepts are estimated 
using a 36-month horizon, where firms enter the month subsequent to the equity issue and exit after 36 months or if delisted. 
The portfolios are divided into stated intended use of proceeds. We use equal-weighted portfolios with monthly rebalancing. 
t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
Consistent with the matched-firm technique, we provide evidence of poor long-run market 
performance following seasoned equity offerings when using different beta pricing models. 
From the one-factor market model in Panel A, the estimated annualised alpha for the portfolio 
of all sample issuers is -10.84% and significant at 1% level. The implied 36-month abnormal 
return is thus -29.1%, well below the mean BHAR of -16.5%. 
 
18 The implied buy-and-hold return over n years using regression intercepts is: [(1 + αp)n – 1] 
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Moreover, we still find that investors can differentiate the issuers based on disclosed 
information on the intended use of proceeds. The sign and relative magnitude of the estimated 
coefficients are fairly consistent with the findings in the previous section when using buy-and-
hold abnormal returns. From Panel A, the annualised monthly alpha for issuers stating specific 
Investment motives is 0.52% and insignificantly different from zero, suggesting that these 
issuers do not exhibit abnormal post-issue returns. The statistical evidence is stronger for 
Capex and General firms, whereof the annualised regression intercepts are -9.07% and -
9.78%, respectively, both statistically significant at conventional confidence levels. Moreover, 
as for the matched-firm technique, issuers raising equity for Refinancing reasons exhibit the 
poorest ex post abnormal performance. Over the 36-month post-issue period, the annualised 
monthly alpha is -21.54% and significant at 5% level. 
The results from Table 8 are generally consistent with the findings of Jegadeesh (2000) and 
Jeanneret (2005), who find that the anomaly still exists when using the time-series regressions. 
However, Eckbo et al. (2000), find that factor-models eliminate the abnormal post-issue 
performance, attributing the underperformance to the incomplete adjustment for risk with 
standard benchmark methodologies. They specifically focus on zero-investment portfolios that 
are long in stocks of SEO firms and short in stocks of non-issuing control firms. For 
robustness, we also follow this approach, where the regression intercepts are reported in Panel 
C. 
Our results are still contrary to the findings of Eckbo et al. (2000). Regardless of the stated 
intended use of proceeds, the annualised monthly alpha is -9.91%. Even though the magnitude 
of the abnormal performance is slightly lower compared to the results in Panel A, the 
regression intercept is still significant at 1%. For issuers stating Investment motives, the 
estimated alpha turns to negative when using zero-investment portfolios. However, the 
intercept is not significantly different from zero, hence we still do not find evidence that these 
issuers underperform over a 36-month horizon. Moreover, we do not find clear evidence that 
issuers citing Capex motives exhibit abnormal post-issue returns. Although the magnitude is 
almost similar to the estimate in Panel A, the statistical evidence is weak. For the portfolios of 
firms raising equity for General and Refinancing reasons, the annualised monthly alphas are -
8.62% and -12.72%, respectively. The regression intercepts are also statistically significant, 
hence our results suggest that the anomaly at least exists within these categories. 
 71 
8.1.3 Seasoned equity offerings and market timing 
To better explain the documented poor ex post stock performance, we extend the analysis in 
the previous subsections and estimate time-series regressions using a 48-month horizon, 
starting 12-months prior to the offering and ending 36-months after. In line with the existing 
literature, we suggest that more ambiguous issuers, such as those disclosing vague investment 
motives or general corporate purposes, are more likely to take advantage of asymmetric 
information and issue equity when overvalued. The timing theory suggests that investors 
underreact to the announcement of the offering when the equity is overvalued, hence the 
underperformance persists in the long-run. As presented in the descriptive statistics in Section 
7.1, the average SEO firm exhibits positive abnormal returns over a two-month period prior 
to the issue announcement. This is also extensively documented across various markets in the 
existing literature, and the apparently poor long-run subsequent stock returns seem to indicate 
that managers are timing these issues around periods of temporary overvaluation. However, 
various theories have been developed to explain managers’ timing ability of seasoned equity 
offerings, whereof some studies suggest that managers take advantage of asymmetric 
information to issue overvalued equity, while others have more rationale explanations where 
the ability to time the market can be extended to a business cycle environment or understood 
as a form of aggregated pseudo market timing. 
To analyse whether this apparent timing ability exists on Oslo Stock Exchange, we include 
the 12-month pre-issue period in our analysis. If the managers take advantage of superior 
information to time the equity offerings, there should follow a long-term reversal in the 
abnormal performance. Thus, given that the pre-issue period captures the timing-effect, the 
abnormal performance should no longer exist. The results are presented in Table 9, where 
Panel A concerns annualised monthly regression intercepts for the SEO firms using calendar-
time portfolio regressions, while Panel B addresses the same results using zero-investment 
portfolios long in the SEO firms and short in the matched non-issuing firms. In Panel C, we 
report mean buy-and-hold abnormal returns using the matched-firm technique. Again, we 
leave the inference of the results from the three-factor model unreported.  
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Table 9 – Time-series regressions on long-run stock returns around SEOs 
 
 Investment Capex General Refinancing All issuers 
 N=36 N=59 N=137 N=46 N=278 
Panel A: Regression intercepts - SEO firms (-12m, +36m) 
CAPM alpha (%) 8.16  0.58 -7.22 -22.69*** -5.26 
FF3M alpha (%) 3.34 -4.70 -14.93*** -33.43*** -13.50*** 
Panel B: Regression intercepts - zero-investment portfolios (-12m, +36m) 
CAPM alpha (%) 7.58 -0.23 -5.92 -16.16** -3.58 
FF3M alpha (%) 5.76 -0.88 -7.18* -19.81*** -5.88** 
Panel C: Buy-and-hold abnormal returns 
BHAR (-12m, +12m) (%) 31.32*    1.02 -3.12 -38.12*** -2.25 
BHAR (-12m, +24m) (%) 20.20 -10.05 -6.66 -49.08*** -9.90* 
BHAR (-12m, +36m) (%) 10.11 -22.10 -5.32 -49.10*** -13.58** 
Note: The table presents long-run stock returns around equity offerings. In Panel A and B, we report results from 48-month 
calendar-time portfolio regressions, where the regression intercepts are annualised monthly abnormal returns. In Panel C, we 
report BHARs using three different test periods. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, 
respectively. 
From Panel A, the annualised monthly regression intercept for the portfolio of all issuers is 
reduced from -10.84% (in Table 8) to -5.26% after including the 12-month pre-issue period 
and is no longer significant at traditional confidence levels. The same holds for the zero-
investment portfolio in Panel B. Albeit the regression intercepts are negative, we find no 
evidence that SEO firms on average significantly underperform over a 48-month period 
starting 12 months prior to the offering. However, from the matched-firm technique in Panel 
C, we still find evidence of poor stock performance for SEO firms in the years surrounding 
the equity offerings. Even though the sign and magnitude of the mean 48-month BHAR of -
13.58% is relatively consistent with the estimated regression intercepts in Panel A and B, it is 
statistically significant at 5% level. Still, the underperformance is less severe compared to the 
results in Table 7. 
More importantly, we provide evidence that the underperformance is restricted to issuers 
stating Refinancing purposes when including the pre-issue period. In Panel A and B, none of 
the regression intercepts for the portfolios of Investment, Capex and General firms are 
statistically significant. Conversely, we still find evidence of abnormal stock returns for the 
portfolio of Refinancing firms, where the regression intercepts are significantly negative. 
Supportive evidence is provided in Panel C, using the matched-firm technique. 
Figure 7 better illustrates our findings, showing the development in long-run buy-and-hold 
abnormal returns when starting 12 months prior to the offering. Refinancing issuers experience 
on average negative abnormal returns during the pre-issue period and continue to 
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underperform in the subsequent months. For all other sub-categories, the abnormal stock 
performance increases until the month of the equity offering. We particularly note that the pre-
issue performance is strong for issuers stating Investment reasons, followed by no or little 
abnormal performance over the subsequent 36-month period. This may suggest that these 
issuers reduce the asymmetric information when firm prospects are improving and 
subsequently raise equity to take on arising growth opportunities. In contrast, Capex and 
General firms tend to peak around the month of the offering and exhibit a reversal in the 
abnormal returns during the post-issue period, suggesting that the timing-motive generally is 
restricted to these issuers. Moreover, we note that most of the weak post-issue performance 
for issuers stating General motives seem to occur within the first 12 months after the offering. 
This could mean that the market is aware of the managers’ timing ability, and the price 
correction is done completely within a 12-month period. Conversely, SEO firms stating vague 
investment motives (Capex) on average exhibit lower returns relative to its matched non-
issuing firms over the entire post-issue period of 36 months. Thus, we suggest that the poor 
post-issue performance for these issuers cannot be fully explained by managers utilising the 
opportunity window, but rather in combination with an overinvestment problem in which 
managers invest heavily at a lower rate of return than the market assess as the marginal benefit 
of new investments. It is thus challenging for investors to correctly incorporate the new 
information revealed, and the market underreacts upon the announcement.  
Figure 7 – Development in 48-month mean buy-and-hold abnormal returns 
around SEOs 
 
Note: The figure shows the development in average BHARs for the various classifications of intended use of proceeds over 
a period starting 12 months prior to the equity offering to 36 months after.  
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Summing up long-term stock price dynamics around SEOs 
Overall, the results from Section 8.1 suggest that firms experience abnormally low stock 
returns over a three-year period following seasoned equity offerings. However, much of this 
underperformance is reverted when including the pre-issue period, hence our findings are 
generally consistent with the timing theory in which managers appear to issue equity around 
periods that are followed by poor stock performance. Although we do not provide evidence 
for an underlying explanation of the observed timing-ability, the characteristical performance 
of the various intended use of proceeds categories helps to differentiate issuers that may have 
a timing-motive to those that are in swift need of liquidity or credibly intend to take on 
profitable investments. Another interesting feature is that the relative market reactions upon 
announcement for the various use of proceeds categories are generally consistent with the 
long-run abnormal stock performance. This suggests that investors systemically 
underestimate, but correctly show the direction of, valuation effects upon the announcement 
of equity offerings when proceeds are not intended for specific investment reasons. This 
implies that investors are overly optimistic about these firms’ prospects at the time of the 
announcement, which again may be attributed to some form of timing ability. Also, a more 
rational cause of the observed stock price dynamics may be related to the investment-based 
explanation by Carlson et al. (2006), suggesting that investment projects can be viewed as real 
options, hence upon exercise the required return would decrease. Given that such growth 
options only will be exercised when moving sufficiently in-the-money, the model also 
explains the pre-issue price runup. We consider these possible explanations more closely in 
the Section 8.2, where we analyse ex post firm characteristics. 
Although the literature is inconclusive in explaining the causes for the apparent timing ability, 
we admit that managers generally have incentives to issue equity during periods where the 
investor sentiment is especially strong, both to take advantage of overly optimistic market 
expectations, as well increasing the likelihood of a successful placement of new shares. 
However, the characteristics of the Norwegian market provide some interesting perceptions as 
most of the equity offerings are conducted through private placements. Most firms appear to 
prefer issuing discounted equity to certain “friendly” new and/or existing shareholders, 
possibly with the rationale of benefitting from increased monitoring services and expert advice 
or to maintain private benefits of control. Consequently, to avoid issuing undervalued equity 
to attract these targeted investors, managers may be willing to postpone investment 
opportunities until, or instinctively raise equity in, periods of temporary overvaluation. 
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8.2 Ex post use of proceeds and operating performance 
In order to further explain the findings from the previous sections, we turn our attention to ex 
post firm characteristics. To be consistent with the analysis of long-run post-issue stock 
performance, we only consider the same sample of 278 issuers of seasoned equity as in Section 
8.1, excluding all overlapping events within a three-year period. Firstly, we analyse the ex post 
use of funds through various financial ratios over the years following the equity offerings. 
Moreover, we examine the post-issue operating performance using univariate nonparametric 
tests. Finally, we test whether the prospectus disclosure can help in differentiate firms with 
better post-offering prospects when controlling for other ex ante factors. 
8.2.1 Ex post use of proceeds and firm characteristics 
In Table 10, we follow Walker and Yost (2008) and present median firm characteristics from 
the end of the fiscal year prior to the offering to three years after. All statistics are denominated 
by total assets in the pre-issue year, hence the rationale is to evaluate the ex post use of funds. 
Table 10 – Ex post use of funds  
      
 Variable (yr. n)/Assets (yr. -1) yr. -1 yr. 0 yr. +1 yr. +2 yr. +3 
Total Assets      
  Investment  1.0000 1.6700*** 2.2040*** 2.5480*** 2.5980*** 
  Capex  1.0000 1.4950*** 1.6810*** 2.2990*** 2.5510*** 
  General  1.0000 1.1290*** 1.1940*** 1.3340*** 1.3070*** 
  Refinancing  1.0000 0.8860* 0.8370 0.8840 0.7440 
  All issuers  1.0000 1.1640*** 1.3080*** 1.4490*** 1.4320*** 
Capital Expenditures     
  Investment  0.0550 0.0870*** 0.1600*** 0.1440*** 0.1150*** 
  Capex  0.0740 0.1260*** 0.1160*** 0.1650*** 0.1420*** 
  General  0.0390 0.0460* 0.0380 0.0480 0.0460 
  Refinancing  0.0490 0.0310*** 0.0240*** 0.0230*** 0.0270*** 
  All issuers  0.0470 0.0510*** 0.0490*** 0.0540*** 0.0560*** 
Total LT Debt     
  Investment  0.3910 0.5830*** 0.7930*** 0.8140*** 0.8340*** 
  Capex  0.4060 0.4980*** 0.5480*** 0.4860*** 0.6600*** 
  General  0.3670 0.3730 0.4060*** 0.4370*** 0.4410*** 
  Refinancing  0.4970 0.3850*** 0.3360*** 0.3650* 0.3080** 
  All issuers  0.3910 0.4040*** 0.4330*** 0.4480*** 0.4630*** 
Working Capital     
  Investment  0.1670 0.0540* 0.1450** 0.1190 0.0800 
  Capex  0.1820 0.1870*** 0.1570** 0.2000 0.1700 
  General  0.1190 0.1790*** 0.1610*** 0.1660*** 0.1490*** 
  Refinancing  0.0120 0.0390*** 0.0370*** 0.0620*** 0.0290*** 
  All issuers  0.1260 0.1310*** 0.1290*** 0.1340*** 0.1200*** 
Note: The table presents post-issue firm characteristics standardised by total book assets in the year preceding the SEO. Only 
median values are reported. Two-population Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) tests are used to test the differences in 
medians. ***, **, and * denote significant differences between the statistic for year 0, +1, +2 and +3 relative to year −1, at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence levels. 
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In the first category, we report the growth in total assets. The results provide some interesting 
features, whereof the median issuer stating Investment or Capex motives more than double its 
asset base over a three year period subsequent to the year preceding the offering. The absolute 
increase in total assets for General firms is more moderate, where the median firm increases 
assets by 30% over the post-issue period of three years. For issuers where the stated primary 
motivation for the equity issue is to refinance debt, the median firm exhibits a decline in total 
assets over the subsequent period, but not significantly different from the year preceding the 
offering. Another interesting feature is that we find no significant change in working capital 
in absolute terms in two and three years following the equity offering for issuers stating 
Investment or Capex motives. However, the median General and Refinancing firms 
significantly increase their level of working capital in the SEO year, with no or little 
subsequent change from the issue year and throughout the post-issue period. 
Moreover, we find that the median Investment and Capex firms significantly increase their 
long-term debt in the offering year and continue to take on more debt throughout the post-
issue period. We also note that the median General firm increases its long-term debt, but more 
modestly. These findings are generally consistent with those of Walker and Yost (2008), who 
find that SEO firms are not making a choice between equity and debt to finance future growth 
initiatives, but rather use both sources of financing.  However, for firms intending to raise 
equity for Refinancing purposes, we find a significant decline in the absolute debt level over 
the entire post-issue period, consistent with the stated intention in the prospectus disclosure. 
In Table 11, we present univariate tests on change in leverage and liquidity ratios. In contrast 
to Table 10, where all statistics are denominated by total assets in the pre-issue year (year -1), 
we here document leverage and liquidity ratios as they change over the years following the 
equity offerings. We measure leverage as total debt scaled by total assets, while the firm 
liquidity is proxied by working capital relative to total assets. Again, we only consider median 
statistics. 
We do not find evidence that the typical SEO firm changes its capital structure significantly. 
The results suggest that the leverage is somewhat reduced during the issue year, but we find 
no significant changes over the next three years relative to the pre-issue leverage. These 
findings are consistent with what we presented in Table 10, where investment programs are 
funded through both equity and debt, hence the capital structure remains unchanged. 
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Table 11 – Ex post change in leverage and liquidity ratio 
Variable (yr. n)/Assets (yr. n)  Changes 
  yr.-1 yr. -1 to 0 yr. -1 to +1 yr. -1 to +2 yr. -1 to +3 
LT Debt/TA      
  Investment  0.3910 -0.0137 -0.0047 0.0132 -0.0042 
  Capex  0.4060 -0.0219 -0.0059 -0.0039 -0.0236 
  General  0.3670 -0.0064 0.0142* 0.0096 0.0100 
  Refinancing  0.4970 -0.0114* -0.0621*** -0.0204* -0.0621* 
  All issuers  0.3910 -0.0097* -0.0045 -0.0024 -0.0061 
WC/TA     
  Investment  0.1670 -0.0168* -0.0709*** -0.0631** -0.0640 
  Capex  0.1820 -0.0085 -0.0412** -0.1112*** -0.0755*** 
  General  0.1190 0.0075 0.0047 -0.0095 -0.0397* 
  Refinancing  0.0120 0.0349 0.0734** 0.0444* 0.0498* 
  All issuers  0.1260 0.0004 -0.0168 -0.0224** -0.0390** 
Note: The table presents changes in median long-term debt and working capital scaled by total assets. In the left column, we 
report the variables in the year prior to the equity offering, while the other columns report the change in the respective 
variables for year 0, +1, +2 and +3 relative to year -1. For changes, we use Wilcoxon signed rank test to examine whether the 
change is significantly different from zero. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
Although we do not find evidence of any change in the ex post capital structure for the median 
SEO firm, the results from Table 11 indicate that these findings are partly restricted to issuers 
stating Investment, Capex and General purposes for the capital raise. Conversely, for issuers 
in financial distress, or those that generally intend to alter the debt structure, the leverage is 
significantly lower in the post-issue period relative to the year preceding the offering of 
seasoned equity. This confirms that these issuers credibly signal the proceeds are raised with 
the purpose of de-lever their balance sheets. 
Considering ex post firm liquidity, we find evidence that the relative liquidity levels for the 
median Investment and Capex firms decline significantly during the post-issue period, 
consistent with that these firms appear to use financing proceeds to invest in fixed assets. 
Moreover, for issuers stating General motives, the relative liquidity level remains largely 
unchanged. The median firm tends to increase the post-issue working capital level somewhat, 
hence investment in fixed assets increases at the similar rate as the level of working capital. 
Finally, we provide evidence of increasingly ex post liquidity for firms stating Refinancing 
motives. The median firm exhibits an absolute increase in working capital, while the change 
in assets is negative or unchanged over the post-issue period, which is reasonable due to the 
usually distressed conditions. 
Summing up ex post firm characteristics 
Overall, the results from Table 10 and Table 11 suggest that SEO firms disclosing Investment 
or Capex motives are credibly signalling that the issue proceeds will be deployed to grow its 
asset base. The results also suggest that these firms are not making a choice of equity versus 
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debt, but rather are raising capital through both sources. Without considering the post-issue 
operating performance, these findings generally support our argument in Section 8.1, that the 
long-run stock underperformance for firms disclosing vague investment motives may be partly 
attributed to an overinvestment problem. The findings are also be partly consistent with time-
variant expected returns from the real option-based explanation by Carlson et al. (2006). 
Moreover, for General firms, the results suggest that these issuers are using proceeds to invest 
relatively modestly. This subgroup also tends to add on some more debt in the subsequent 
years, hence the capital structure remains largely unchanged. We argue that this further 
supports our argument of a timing-motive, where the issue proceeds are not, at large, used to 
optimise the capital structure or grow the business, but rather to some extent take advantage 
of overvalued equity. This is also consistent with the observed increase in working capital, in 
which these issuers may be temporarily parking the funds as liquid assets until the firm is 
revalued by the market. 
Finally, for issuers stating Refinancing motives, the results provide evidence that these firms 
credibly signal that the proceeds will be used to de-lever the balance sheet. As previously 
explained, the majority of these issuers are to a various degree in financial distress, hence 
forced to raise equity to meet its debt commitments. Although these issuers significantly 
increase the relative level of working capital, we note that the increase is not substantial, and 
the absolute change in working capital indicates that these firms continue to have relatively 
poor liquidity over the post-issue period. 
8.2.2 Ex post operating performance 
Here, we examine ex post operating performance using both univariate and multivariate tests. 
We measure operating performance as return on assets, presenting both unadjusted and 
adjusted measures. We strict our analysis to nonparametric tests. The objective is to test 
whether the operating performance changes significantly over the post-issue period, and to 
what degree the operating performance is consistent with the observed stock price returns. Due 
to missing accounting data and delisted firms during the period, our sample includes 273 SEOs 
in the year prior to the offering and declines to 211 issuers three years after the offering. 
In Table 12, we present the results from the univariate tests on post-issue operating 
performance. We report median return on assets ratios for each classification of the intended 
use of proceeds, starting one year prior to the offering and ending three years after. 
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Additionally, as described in Section 6.3, we include two adjusted performance measures: 
industry-adjusted ROA and industry-and performance-adjusted ROA, where we adjust the 
return on assets ratio for the median industry level and a matched non-event firm, respectively. 
A caveat before proceeding with the results is that the change in return on assets ratios may be 
very misleading in the way that issuers exhibiting a decline in earnings while increasing total 
assets relatively more will actually improve the operating performance ratio, given that the 
earnings initially are negative. However, there do not seem to be a common method to deal 
with such issues in the literature, hence we stick to the conventional method with a cautious 
interpretation. 
Table 12 – Operating performance around seasoned equity offerings 
Net income (yr. n)/Assets (yr. n)      
  yr.-1 yr.0 yr.1 yr.2 yr.3 Rank-sum tests 
 N= 273 N=270 N=255 N=237 N=211 yr.2 vs. yr.0 yr.3 vs. yr.0 
Investment        
  ROA  2.84% 2.33% 2.58% 0.25% 1.48% z = -1.99** z = -0.54 
  Industry-adjusted ROA 0.32% 0.17% 1.37% -1.09% 0.39% z = -1.23 z = 0.65 
  Ind./Perform. adj. ROA -1.06% -0.01% -1.04% -1.78% -0.07% z = -0.58 z = 0.54 
Capex        
  ROA  -3.32% -3.45% -4.06% -4.40% -2.45% z = -1.55 z = -0.39 
  Industry-adjusted ROA -5.22% -4.15% -4.05% -4.91% -3.81% z = -1.12 z = -0.10 
  Ind./Perform. adj. ROA -3.23% 0.01% -1.39% -4.25% -3.42% z = -2.47** z = -1.03 
General        
  ROA  -2.72% -2.66% -2.66% -1.57% -3.39% z = -0.74 z = -0.63 
  Industry-adjusted ROA -4.31% -2.89% -3.59% -2.45% -3.25% z = -0.99 z = -1.06 
  Ind./Perform. adj. ROA -1.06% 0.01% -0.98% -2.70% -2.25% z = -1.76* z = -1.67* 
Refinancing        
  ROA  -9.06% -9.06% -5.57% -4.79% -2.51% z = 0.74 z = 2.03** 
  Industry-adjusted ROA -11.5% -9.76% -5.21% -3.73% -4.91% z = 0.53 z = 1.89* 
  Ind./Perform. adj. ROA -4.02% 0.00% -0.40% -0.77% 0.81% z = -0.48 z = 0.49 
All issuers        
  ROA  -2.27% -2.42% -1.72% -1.56% -1.91% z = -1.49 z = -0.21 
  Industry-adjusted ROA -3.95% -2.89% -3.22% -2.64% -2.53% z = -1.35 z = -0.32 
  Ind./Perform. adj. ROA -1.62% 0.01% -1.04% -3.14% -2.70% z = -2.82*** z = -1.66* 
Note: The table presents the median return on assets for each category of intended use of proceeds from the year prior to the 
equity offering (yr. -1) to three years following the offering (yr. 3). ROA is estimated as net income in year n divided by total 
assets in year n. Industry adjusted ROA is estimated by subtracting the median industry level of ROA (based on the first 
two/four digits in the GICS-code) from the issuer’s level in each particular year. Ind./Perform. adj. ROA refers to industry-
/performance adjusted ROA, and is estimated by subtracting the ROA of a control firm that is within the same industry and 
has the closest ROA ratio in the issue year. In the right columns, we report z-statistics from two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum 
tests for differences in medians between the post-issue years and the issue year. 
Considering the unadjusted return on assets ratios in Table 12, we find little or no evidence of 
any significant changes in the operating performance in the post-issue years relative to the 
offering year. However, at sub-levels, our results show that Investment firms tend to 
experience a decline in the operating performance over a two-year period, while Refinancing 
firms increase return on assets over a three-year horizon.  
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These results are in contrast the what we would expect from the long-run post-issue stock 
performance. Additionally, they contradict some of the existing literature which finds that the 
operating performance tends to deteriorate in the years subsequent to the equity offering (see 
Loughran and Ritter, 1997; Autore et al., 2009). Nevertheless, our results are more consistent 
with Hertzel et al. (2002) who find that the operating performance does not deteriorate, but 
rather remains weak over the years following the offering, suggesting that the issuers fail to 
meet market expectations as investors are anticipating an improvement in operating 
performance. However, in line with the findings of Walker and Yost (2008), we argue that 
industry effects are important to control for when examining operating performance, 
particularly in the presence of cyclical industry-characteristics. 
To more properly control for important industry effects, we adjust the operating performance 
measure for the median industry level, as explained in Section 6.4. However, the results in 
Table 12 from the industry-adjusted performance measure do not contribute much to the 
unadjusted return on assets ratios. We do not find evidence that the operating performance 
changes significantly in the post-issue period for the median sample firm. The results indicate 
that only issuers stating Refinancing motives experience an improvement in the industry-
adjusted operating performance, while none of the other subgroups exhibit any significant 
change. The results are somewhat surprising given the weak post-issue market performance 
for Refinancing firms. However, an important notion when examining ex post change in 
operating performance in light of ex post stock returns, is the market expectation. We note that 
ROA for the median issuer within each use of proceeds classification is substantially lower 
than the corresponding industry medians in the year preceding the offering (except the 
Investment category). Although the median firms slightly narrow the gap to the industry 
medians over the post-issue period, they continue to perform considerably weaker, suggesting 
that the market may be overly optimistic that the operating performance will improve 
following the offerings. 
However, we argue that the industry-adjusted performance measure also fails to properly 
capture important industry effects. Due to the cyclical characteristics of the sample firms, the 
industry-classification based on the first two(four) digits in the GICS-code does not control 
for the unique cyclicality within the sub-industry segments. To more properly deal with this, 
we measure the ex post operating performance of each SEO firm against a control firm not 
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subject to the event. The control firm is required to be within the same industry-classification 
as the issuer and to have relatively similar operating performance in the issue year19.  
The post-issue industry-and performance-adjusted ROA is consistent with the argument that 
the market is overly optimistic about that the operating performance will improve in the future. 
From Table 12, our results provide evidence that SEO firms tend to perform significantly 
weaker in the post-issue period relative to the issue year. The median SEO firm exhibits a 
significant decline in the industry-and performance-adjusted ROA over both two-and three-
year horizons. We also note that the performance appears to peak in the year of the equity 
offering, consistent with the findings of Loughran and Ritter (1997) and Autore et al. (2009).  
Moreover, we do not find evidence that firms citing specific Investment motives exhibit any 
changes in the post-issue operating performance. However, for issuers stating Capex or 
General purposes, the median industry-and performance-adjusted ROA is significantly lower 
two years after the offering relative to the issue year. With a three-year horizon, the median 
performance measure is also lower for both subgroups, but only significantly different from 
the issue year for issuers stating General purposes. For issuers disclosing Refinancing reasons, 
we do not find evidence of abnormal ex post operating performance. Although this is in 
contrast to the observed poor post-issue stock performance, we argue that the analysis of 
operating performance measures yields positively biased estimates when firms are delisted for 
bankruptcy reasons. As we only have annual accounting data, there would be an interval 
between the delisting date and last reported financials of up to one year. Given that a firm is 
running towards bankruptcy, the operating performance is likely to suffer even more in the 
last fiscal year of operations, not reflected in our analysis. Consequently, we argue that the 
analysis suffers to some degree of survivorship bias, in particular for the subgroup of 
Refinancing firms, as a relatively larger proportion of these issuers are delisted for bankruptcy 
reasons. 
Finally, in Table 13, we report the estimated coefficients from the quantile regressions. The 
model specifications follow from Equation (13), using change in industry-and performance-
adjusted ROA as the dependent variable. Following Autore et al. (2009), we use median 
quantiles and report t-statistics based on bootstrapped standard errors. All models include year 
 
19 See Section 6.4 for a detailed description of how we compute industry-and performance-adjusted ROA 
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fixed effects. In Panel A, we measure the change in the operating performance measure over 
a two-year horizon starting from the issue year, while we in Panel B measure the change from 
the issue year to three years following the issue. In both panels, we add potential control 
variables to the specific models. In Model (1), our explanatory variables include binary 
indicators for the use of proceeds classifications, using Investment firms as control group. In 
Model (2), we add control variables for pre-issue market value and relative deal value, while 
we in Model (3) control for the pre-issue operating performance.  
Table 13 – Quantile regressions on change in ex post operating 
performance 
 Panel A: Panel B: 
 ∆Ind./Perform. adj. ROA (0, +2) ∆Ind./Perform. adj. ROA (0, +3) 
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) 
Capex -0.075** -0.075* -0.075* -0.069* -0.047 -0.066 
 (-2.44) (-1.68) (-1.82) (-1.69) (-0.88) (-1.46) 
General -0.060* -0.062 -0.052 -0.102** -0.097** -0.095** 
 (-1.76) (-1.38) (-1.24) (-2.23) (-2.11) (-2.11) 
Refinancing -0.031 -0.022 -0.019 -0.052 -0.028 -0.038 
 (-0.43) (-0.27) (-0.22) (-0.91) (-0.35) (-0.58) 
Ln(Market Value)  0.003 0.003  0.012 0.013 
  (0.21) (0.19)  (0.92) (0.85) 
Ln(Relative Deal Size)  0.006 0.006  0.012 0.016 
  (0.36) (0.35)  (0.61) (0.79) 
Pre-Issue ROA   0.007   -0.060 
   (0.11)   (-0.80) 
Constant 0.041 0.034 0.034 -0.045 -0.106 -0.099 
 (0.36) (0.26) (0.23) (-0.43) (-0.57) (-0.66) 
Year FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R2  0.0321 0.0331 0.0314 0.0511 0.0541 0.0618 
N 237 237 237 211 211 211 
Note: The table presents three different models using both median quantile regressions where the dependent variable is the 
change in industry- and performance adjusted ROA from year 0 to year +2 (Panel A) and +3 (Panel B). Investment, General 
and Refinancing are dummy variables of stated intended use of proceeds where Investment is the omitted variable. In Model 
(2), we also include the natural log of the market value, calculated as the stock price times number of shares outstanding one 
day prior to the offering,  and the natural log of the relative deal value, equalling issue proceeds divided by pre issue market 
value. Additionally, in Model (3), we add ROA for the fiscal year ending 1 year prior to the offering. All regression models 
are adjusted for year fixed effects. Bootstrapped standard errors based on 1000 replications are reported in parentheses. *, ** 
and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
From Panel A, in all model specifications, the coefficient on the binary indicator for Capex 
motives enters significantly negative at 10% level, indicating that there are greater declines in 
the operating performance when the intended use of proceeds is for capital expenditures as 
opposed to specific Investment reasons. Moreover, the estimated coefficient on General is 
significantly negative in Model (1), but insignificantly negative in Model (2) and (3), only 
providing partly evidence that issuers disclosing general issue motives experience a relatively 
weaker post-issue operating performance to that of Investment firms. Although the coefficient 
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on Refinancing is negative in all the models, we do not find evidence of significantly weaker 
relative performance for these issuers over the two-year post-issue window. 
The results from Panel B are relatively consistent with the findings in Panel A. However, we 
find weaker evidence that Capex firms experience larger declines in the post-issue operating 
performance relative to Investment firms, as the estimated coefficient is only significantly 
negative in Model (1). The opposite is true for the estimated coefficients on the binary variable 
General, where the coefficients are negative and significant at 5% level in all model 
specifications. We further note that none of the other control variables are significantly 
different from zero at conventional confidence levels in any of the regression models, hence 
we do not find evidence that ex post abnormal operating performance can be explained by 
firm size, relative deal size or pre-issue operating performance. 
Summing up ex post operating performance 
Overall, we find evidence that seasoned equity offerings tend to follow periods of relatively 
poor operating performance, where the median sample firm has negative earnings in the year 
preceding the equity offering. We further find that the operating performance generally is 
weaker than for the median industry firms around the offering year and remains weaker also 
in the subsequent years. Although the operating performance does not change significantly 
over the post-issue period, these firms do not seem to meet market expectations as investors 
may be too optimistic about the potential that the ex post operating performance will improve. 
The documented poor post-issue stock-price performance may thus reflect investor 
disappointment about the failure to reverse the poor operating performance prior to the issue. 
This explanation is consistent with our findings when we adjust the operating performance 
measure for non-issuers matched on industry and ROA in the offering year, where we find that 
the SEO firms exhibit significantly weaker operating performance in the post-issue years.  
Considering the different use of proceeds classifications, we find that the relatively poor ex 
post operating performance can be largely attributed to SEO firms disclosing Capex and 
General motives for the equity issue. We find that the median industry-and performance-
adjusted ROA for these issuers tend to peak in the offering year, consistent with the apparent 
timing-ability documented in Section 8.1.3. Additionally, as previously suggested, the 
relatively weak operating performance for Capex firms may be attributed to an overinvestment 
problem, as we find that these issuers invest significantly during the post-issue period. This is 
also consistent with the observed gradually decline in the abnormal stock returns over the 
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three-year post-issue period. For issuers stating specific Investment motives, we do not find 
any abnormal operating performance in the years following the equity offerings, in line with 
no evidence of long-run post-issue abnormal stock returns.  
The same holds for Refinancing firms, where we argue that the analysis suffers to some degree 
from survivorship bias as many of these firms are going bankrupt during the post-event 
window. Additionally, given the relatively weak pre-issue operating performance, we suggest 
that investors are anticipating a reversal in the performance of the firms' existing assets in 
place. Even though the median firm improves the operating performance during the post-issue 
period, it still performs weak following the issue, consistent with the idea that the poor stock 
performance reflects investor disappointment about the failure to reverse the operating 
performance. 
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9. Conclusion 
This paper examines the market reaction to the announcement of seasoned equity offerings 
and subsequent long-run stock and operating performance using a sample of 463 SEOs made 
on the Oslo Stock Exchange between 2000 and 2018. We introduce the ex ante stated use of 
proceeds as a differentiating variable to test various branches of the capital structure theory 
applying to equity raising. Specifically, we differentiate between firms that raise equity for 
specific Investment motives or Refinancing reasons to those that choose to be more ambiguous 
about the use of capital inflow. We further divide ambiguous issuers into Capex and General 
motives according to the disclosed information upon announcement of the offering. 
Our main findings suggest that prospectus disclosure on the intended use of proceeds helps to 
differentiate issuers that take advantage of “windows” where the market is overly optimistic 
about future firm prospects to those that are in immediate need of liquidity or credibly intend 
to take on profitable investments. Firstly, we document that firms revealing specific 
investment motives on average exhibit positive abnormal returns upon the announcement of 
the offerings. They also experience strong price runups prior to the announcement and no 
abnormal post-issue stock performance. The findings suggest that these firms lower the 
asymmetric information when firm prospects are improving, and subsequently raise equity to 
take on arising growth opportunities. These firms also appear to credibly signal that the 
proceeds are raised for a value-increasing manner, as they exhibit strong growth in fixed assets 
with no subsequent deterioration in the operating performance. Second, we find that more 
ambiguous issuers, stating either vague investment motives or general corporate purposes, 
suffer from relatively large offer price discounts and accordingly negative market reactions 
upon the announcement of the offerings. These issuers also exhibit strong pre-issue stock 
returns and subsequently poor stock and operating performance. Specifically, we suggest that 
firms disclosing that proceeds are raised for general corporate purposes are more likely to take 
advantage of asymmetric information and issue equity in periods of temporary overvaluation. 
Our results indicate that these issuers park the proceeds in liquid assets, hence given that the 
market underreacts to the issue announcement, the firms manage to transfer wealth from new 
to existing shareholders. Also, a related explanation may be that managers intend to mask bad 
information about the future firm prospects, and consequently the investors are left 
overoptimistic at the time of the offering. The findings are supported by a relative steep 
correction in stock prices during the first 12 months following the equity offerings. On the 
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other hand, we suggest that agency problems are more pronounced for issuers revealing vague 
investment motives. These issuers appear to invest heavily in a value-decreasing manner 
during the post-issue period, which implies that investors are too optimistic about the future 
payoffs from the anticipated growth opportunities. We also note that these firms hold higher 
levels of working capital prior to the issue, in line with the theory that issuers with higher 
financial slack are more prone to take on unprofitable projects. Finally, the empirical results 
indicate that issuers stating refinancing reasons usually are in financial distress and raise equity 
during prolonged market downturns. The offer price is often set well below the market price 
to ensure a successful completion of the offering, where the announcement return suffers 
accordingly. These issuers also significantly underperform benchmark firms matched on size 
and book-to-market over a three-year period subsequent to the offering. Given the relatively 
weak pre-issue operating performance, we suggest that investors are anticipating a turnaround 
in the performance of the firms' existing assets. Albeit the median firm manage to improve the 
operating performance during the post-issue period, it still performs weak following the issue, 
consistent with the idea that investors are disappointed when the performance does not 
improve satisfactorily. 
Although we do not provide clear evidence for an underlying explanation of the apparent 
timing-ability, the characteristical performance of the various intended use of proceeds 
categories helps to differentiate issuers with better post-offering prospects. We also conclude 
that investors systemically underestimate, but correctly show the direction of valuation effects 
upon the announcement of equity offerings when proceeds are not intended for specific 
investment reasons. While we do not preclude that mispricing is a partial determinant of the 
equity offerings, we suggest that firms choose the least costly way of financing, which includes 
utilising periods where the accessibility to capital is better, often associated with overly 
optimistic market expectations. 
The findings are especially interesting considering that most of the offerings are conducted 
through private placements, where certain investors often are offered new shares at a 
substantial discount. This may suggest that managers prefer to postpone investments until a 
“window of opportunity” arises to incentivise targeted investors to participate through price 
discounts without issuing undervalued equity. However, we raise questions around the 
flexibility for firms to time the offerings. Given that firms raise capital when needed, and it 
might be debatable whether they have sufficient flexibility to wait for these attractive 
windows. 
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Finally, our findings are economically important in the sense that the disclosed information 
on the intended use of proceeds is available to market participants upon or prior to the offering 
of seasoned equity. This means that investors can use ex ante information to get valuable 
insights into the future stock performance of the issuing firm. 
That said, Prediction is very difficult, especially about the future – Niels Bohr 
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Appendix A: Statistical tests 
Tests used for statistical significance: 
One sample t-test 
In order to test the different cumulative- and buy-and-hold abnormal return for the respective 
use of proceeds are statistically different from zero we utilised the t-test, with the following 
null hypothesis: 
𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ (𝜏1, 𝜏2) = 0                                                          Eq. (1) 
𝐵𝐴𝐻𝑅𝑇̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ = 0                                                                 Eq. (2) 
and with the corresponding test estimators: 
𝜃1 =
𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ (𝜏1, 𝜏2)
√𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ (𝜏1, 𝜏2))
~𝑁(0,1)                                         Eq. (3) 
𝜃2 =
𝐵𝐴𝐻𝑅𝑇̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
√𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝐵𝐴𝐻𝑅𝑇)̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
~𝑁(0,1)                                                Eq. (4) 
 
An important notice is the assumption of no correlation between the abnormal returns and 
the different issues. Our test statistics are presented in Table 3, 5 and 7. 
 
One sample Wilcoxon signed-rank test 
The Wilcoxon signed-rank test is a nonparametric substitute for the conventional t-test. The 
observations Di are assumed to follow a symmetric distribution, hence under the null 
hypothesis the median of the Di is equal to zero. 
First, subtract the hypothesized mean, uW,R, from each data value and rank the value according 
to their absolute values, and compute the sum of the positive ranks Sp and the negative ranks 
Sn. The test statistic WR is then the minimum of Sn and Sp. The compute the z-value using: 
𝑧𝑊 =
𝑊𝑅 − 𝜇𝑊𝑅
𝜎𝑊𝑅
                                                             Eq. (5) 
The mean and standard deviation of WR  is computed as: 
µ𝑊𝑅 =
𝑛(𝑛 + 1)
4
                                                            Eq. (6) 
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𝜎𝑊𝑅 = √
𝑛(𝑛 + 1)(2𝑛 + 1)
24
−
∑ 𝑡3 − ∑ 𝑡
48
                                   Eq. (7) 
where t represents the number of times the ith value occurs. 
We present z-statistics from the one-sample signed-rank test in Table 3, 5, 7 and 11. 
Two-sample tests 
In order to test for differences is the population we have utilised the Welch´s t-test and 
Wilcoxon ran-sum test. The distinctive difference between the two tests is that the Welch-test 
uses the population mean, while the Wilcoxon ran-sum test tests the median for the population.  
Welch´s t-test 
The Welch´s t-test is used to see if the two-sample means are significantly different from each 
other, thus we can formulate the following null hypothesis: 
𝜇1 = 𝜇2                 Eq. (8) 
and with the corresponding test estimator: 
𝑡 =
(𝑋1̅̅ ̅ − 𝑋2̅̅ ̅)
√𝑠1
2
𝑁1
+
𝑠2
2
𝑁2
                                                             Eq. (9) 
Where 𝑋𝑖𝑡, 𝑠𝑖2and 𝑛𝑖 are the mean, sample variance and sample size for the ith group, 
respectively. We report test statistics from the Welch´s t-test in Table 4, 5 and 7. 
Wilcoxon rank-sum test 
Furthermore, we conduct a Wilcoxon rank-sum test, with the sample size of 𝑛1 from 𝑋1and 
𝑛2 for 𝑋2, to test for the following null hypothesis: 
𝑋1 = 𝑋2                                                               Eq. (10) 
and with the corresponding test estimator: 
𝑍 =
𝑇 − 𝐸(𝑇)
√𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑇)
                                                        Eq. (11) 
Wilcoxon test statistics (1945) is gathered from the sum of the ranks Ri for the observations in 
the first sample (𝑛1): 
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𝑇 = ∑ 𝑅1𝑖
𝑛1
𝑖=1
                                                              Eq. (12) 
moreover: 
𝐸(𝑇) =
𝑛1(𝑛 + 1)
2
                                                  Eq. (13) 
and: 
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑇) =
𝑛1𝑛2𝑠2
𝑛
                                                  Eq. (14) 
where 𝑠 is the standard deviation of the combined ranks, 𝑟𝑖, for both groups: 
𝑠2 =
1
𝑛 − 1
 ∑(𝑟𝑖−?̅?)2                                          Eq. (15)
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
Test statistics from the Wilcoxon rank-sum test are presented in Table 4, 5, 7, 10 and 12. 
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Appendix B: Use of proceeds examples 
Table B.1 – Specific examples on disclosure of intended use of proceeds  
 
Note: The table presents specific examples on disclosed information of the intended use for proceeds.  
Source: Newsweb (2019) 
Issuer Announcment date
Use of 
proceeds 
category
Use of proceeds as reported by Newsweb
Flex LNG 10.10.2018 Investment
FLEX LNG Ltd. is contemplating to enter into 
a transaction for the acquisition of five 5th 
generation LNG newbuldings
Lerøy Seafood 
Group ASA 02.06.2018 Investment
Acquisition of shares in Havfisk ASA and 
Norway Seafoods Group AS
Axactor 17.02.2016 Capex
The net proceeds from the Private Placement 
will be used for acquisitions of non -
performing loan portfolios and platforms as 
well as for general corporate purposes.
NEL ASA 27.11.2014 Capex
The net proceeds from the Private Placement 
will be used to fund strategic growth 
initiatives within the Company's business, 
including inorganic growth opportunities.
Petroleum Geo 
Services 11.11.2015 General
The proceeds from the Private Placement will 
be used to strengthen the Company's balance 
sheet and liquidity position as well as for 
general corporate purposes
Nordic 
Semiconductor ASA 24.04.2018 General
The net proceeds from the Private Placement 
will overall be used to maintain financial 
flexibility and to fund growth in working 
capital while securing and maximising the 
company's growth potential
Archer Ltd 28.02.2017 Refinancing
The Company is pleased to announce a 
comprehensive refinancing, including an 
equity issue to re-establish a robust financial 
platform for the Company.
Seabird Exploration 
PLC 29.01.2015 Refinancing
As previously announced, SeaBird is in default 
on its existing bonds and loans and certain 
other of its financial commitments and 
requires new sources of funds to sustain its 
operations.
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Appendix C: Industry-composition 
Table C.1 – Industry-composition per category of intended use of proceeds 
Panel A: Number of SEOs per industry and use of proceeds category  
Sector Investment Capex General Refinancing All issuers 
Oil & Gas 26 31 68 24 149 
Technology 7 18 38 12 75 
Transportation 11 16 25 13 65 
Consumer Products 12 6 17 12 47 
Finance & Insurance 5 7 27 2 41 
Utility & Energy 5 11 17 5 38 
Healthcare 4 7 23 1 35 
Real Estate/Property 2 1 7 3 13 
Total 72 97 222 72 463 
Panel B: Percentage share of total number of SEOs per industry classification 
Sector Investment Capex General Refinancing All issuers 
Oil & Gas 36% 32% 31% 33% 32% 
Technology 10% 19% 17% 17% 16% 
Shipping/Transportation 15% 16% 11% 18% 14% 
Consumer Products 17% 6% 8% 17% 10% 
Finance & Insurance 7% 7% 12% 3% 9% 
Utility & Energy 7% 11% 8% 7% 8% 
Healthcare 6% 7% 10% 1% 8% 
Real Estate/Property 3% 1% 3% 4% 3% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Note: In Panel A, we present total number of sample SEO per industry and intended use of proceeds category. In Panel B, we 
report the percentage share of total number of SEOs per intended use of proceeds category for each industry-classification.  
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Appendix D: Correlation matrix 
Table D.1 - Correlation matrix between explanatory variables 
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Note: The table presents a correlation matrix between all the explanatory variables from the cross-sectional regression analysis 
on SEO announcement returns in Table 6. 
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Appendix E: OLS regressions on CAR(-1,1) 
Table E.1 – Cross-sectional regression analysis on SEO announcement 
returns 
Dependent variable: CAR(-1,1) Model 
(1) 
Model 
(2) 
Model 
(3) 
Model 
(4) 
Model 
(5) 
Model 
(6) 
Capex -0.025 -0.035 -0.032 -0.014 -0.005 -0.003 
 (-0.97) (-1.35) (-1.36) (-0.97) (-0.32) (-0.22) 
General -0.066** -0.063** -0.056** -0.038*** -0.026 -0.024 
 (-2.52) (-2.49) (-2.53) (-2.64) (-1.60) (-1.35) 
Refinancing -0.112*** -0.099*** -0.067** -0.066** -0.010 -0.007 
 (-2.98) (-2.75) (-2.31) (-2.29) (-0.38) (-0.25) 
Fully Marketed  -0.075 -0.075 -0.081* -0.015 -0.026 
  (-1.54) (-1.50) (-1.74) (-0.30) (-0.43) 
Accelerated  0.069*** 0.097*** 0.057*** 0.069** 0.073** 
  (3.70) (4.02) (2.90) (2.55) (2.39) 
Accelerated*Offer Discount   -0.237** -0.276*** -0.270* -0.283* 
   (-2.00) (-2.77) (-1.89) (-1.94) 
Relative Deal Size    -0.031*** -0.024** -0.024** 
    (-3.23) (-1.98) (-2.17) 
Accelerated*Relative Deal Size    0.060*** 0.054*** 0.054*** 
    (4.35) (3.57) (3.81) 
Ln(Market Value)     0.019** 0.025** 
     (2.05) (2.22) 
Ln(BM)     -0.008 -0.006 
     (-0.73) (-0.44) 
Runup     -0.001 -0.009 
     (-0.02) (-0.23) 
Volatility     0.025 0.030 
     (0.75) (0.91) 
Ln(Stock Turnover)     -0.014** -0.017** 
     (-2.04) (-2.20) 
Recent Issue     0.047*** 0.047*** 
     (3.13) (2.86) 
ROA      -0.059* 
      (-1.89) 
Accruals      0.053 
      (0.97) 
Leverage      -0.051* 
      (-1.66) 
WC/TA      -0.017 
      (-0.45) 
Constant 0.050 0.029 0.020 0.030 0.118 0.189** 
 (1.15) (0.71) (0.54) (0.88) (1.53) (2.08) 
Year FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.074 0.119 0.154 0.267 0.271 0.276 
N 463 463 463 463 404 376 
Note: The table presents the results from the cross-sectional regression analysis on SEO announcement returns using OLS 
regressions, similar to what we presented in Table 6. The dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal return measured 
over a five-day event window around the SEO announcement date i.e. CAR (-1, 1). The explanatory variables are defined in 
Section 6. T-statistics are reported in parenthesis and are based on standard errors adjusted for heteroscedasticity and firm 
clustering. All models include year and industry fixed-effects. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 101 
Appendix F: Factor loadings time-series regressions 
Table F.1 – Time-series regressions on 36-month long-run post-issue stock 
returns - CAPM 
 
 Investment Capex General Refinancing All issuers 
 N=36 N=59 N=137 N=46 N=278 
Panel A: Portfolios of issuing firms 
CAPM alpha (%) 0.043 -0.756* -0.815** -1.795** -0.903*** 
 (0.10) (-1.66) (-2.07) (-2.58) (-2.72) 
MKT 0.933*** 1.073*** 0.956*** 1.167*** 1.020*** 
 (13.06) (14.17) (14.60) (10.12) (18.50) 
Adj. R2 0.463 0.496 0.511 0.333 0.627 
Panel B: Portfolios of matched non-issuing firms 
CAPM alpha (%) 0.071 -0.264 0.018 -0.337 -0.078 
 (0.15) (-0.89) (0.06) (-0.46) (-0.28) 
MKT 1.055*** 0.820*** 0.885*** 1.058*** 0.902*** 
 (13.11) (16.59) (17.89) (8.72) (19.43) 
Adj. R2 0.457 0.575 0.611 0.270 0.650 
Panel C: Zero-investment portfolios 
CAPM alpha (%) -0.294 -0.718 -1.060*** -1.685* -0.826*** 
 (-0.49) (-1.61) (-3.20) (-1.79) (-3.20) 
MKT -0.125 0.259*** 0.078 0.115 0.118*** 
 (-1.28) (3.50) (1.41) (0.74) (2.76) 
Adj. R2 0.003 0.052 0.005 -0.002 0.031 
Note: The table is similar to that we presented in Table 8 for the one-factor market model, but we here also report the factor 
loadings. Note also that we only report monthly regression intercepts. Panels A and B report monthly alpha estimates for the 
sample SEO firms and non-issuing matched firms using the calendar-time portfolio models in Equation (11) and (12). Panel 
C contains estimated alphas from the zero-investment portfolios which are long in the event firms and short in the matched 
non-event firms. The regression intercepts are estimated using a 36-month horizon, where firms enter the month subsequent 
to the equity issue and exit after 36 months or if delisted. The portfolios are divided into stated intended use of proceeds. We 
use equal-weighted portfolios with monthly rebalancing. t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. *, ** and *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table F.2 - Time-series regressions on 36-month long-run post-issue stock 
returns – FF3M 
 
 Investment Capex General Refinancing All issuers 
 N=36 N=59 N=137 N=46 N=278 
Panel A: Portfolios of issuing firms 
FF3M alpha (%) -0.230 -1.054** -1.374*** -2.556*** -1.423*** 
 (-0.52) (-2.33) (-3.75) (-3.78) (-4.74) 
MKT 1.094*** 1.228*** 1.266*** 1.590*** 1.307*** 
 (12.33) (13.29) (16.92) (11.54) (21.34) 
SMB 0.417*** 0.488*** 0.820*** 1.111*** 0.771*** 
 (2.89) (3.27) (6.78) (4.99) (7.79) 
HML 0.062 -0.293** 0.036 0.081 -0.016 
 (0.55) (-2.53) (0.38) (0.47) (-0.21) 
Adj. R2 0.481 0.529 0.599 0.402 0.711 
Panel B: Portfolios of matched non-issuing firms 
FF3M alpha (%) -0.432 -0.648** -0.390 -0.984 -0.524** 
 (-0.92) (-2.30) (-1.40) (-1.36) (-2.08) 
MKT 1.340*** 1.032*** 1.110*** 1.417*** 1.150*** 
 (13.92) (17.95) (19.53) (9.57) (22.40) 
SMB 0.709*** 0.568*** 0.607*** 0.951*** 0.656*** 
 (4.56) (6.11) (6.61) (3.98) (7.91) 
HML 0.211* 0.003 -0.022 0.032 0.025 
 (1.74) (0.04) (-0.30) (0.17) (0.39) 
Adj. R2 0.512 0.638 0.678 0.317 0.731 
Panel C: Zero-investment portfolios 
FF3M alpha (%) -0.081 -0.635 -1.213*** -1.801* -0.899*** 
 (-0.13) (-1.40) (-3.59) (-1.86) (-3.39) 
MKT -0.256** 0.203** 0.164** 0.181 0.157*** 
 (-2.09) (2.19) (2.37) (0.92) (2.91) 
SML -0.309 -0.075 0.217* 0.164 0.115 
 (-1.55) (-0.50) (1.94) (0.51) (1.31) 
HML -0.167 -0.300** 0.054 0.046 -0.041 
 (-1.07) (-2.58) (0.62) (0.18) (-0.61) 
Adj. R2 0.012 0.076 0.016 -0.011 0.032 
Note: The table is similar to that we presented in Table 8 for the fama-french three-factor model, but we here also report the 
factor loadings. Note also that we only report monthly regression intercepts. Panels A and B report monthly alpha estimates 
for the sample SEO firms and non-issuing matched firms using the calendar-time portfolio models in Equation (11) and (12). 
Panel C contains estimated alphas from the zero-investment portfolios which are long in the event firms and short in the 
matched non-event firms. The regression intercepts are estimated using a 36-month horizon, where firms enter the month 
subsequent to the equity issue and exit after 36 months or if delisted. The portfolios are divided into stated intended use of 
proceeds. We use equal-weighted portfolios with monthly rebalancing. t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. *, ** and *** 
denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
